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GROWING CONSTITUTIONS
Ruth Gordon*
"Constitutionalism is the end product of social, economic,
cultural, and political progress; it can become a tradition
only if itforms part of the shared history of a people. "'
INTRODUCTION
I come to the topic of constitutions as part of a larger study of
"failed" or "collapsed" states in sub-Saharan Africa.2 The demise of
central governing institutions may present societies with fresh oppor-
tunities to completely refashion governing constitutions.3 Accord-
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I H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Po-
litical Paradox, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 65, 80 (Greenberg et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY].
2 See Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems With Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 301 (1995);
[hereinafter Gordon, Some Legal Problems]; Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolo-
nialist Notion, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 903 (1997) [hereinafter Gordon, Saving Failed
States].
3 There have been recent attempts to replace long-governing autocrats through elections
in States which have not been labeled "failed." These efforts have been termed "democratiza-
tion." See generally ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION IN SUB-SA-ARAN AFRICA
(Jennifer A. Widner ed., 1994) [hereinafter ECONOMIC CHANGE]. While attempts at democrati-
zation may not present such pristine prospects for institution building, such attempts operate in
a similar vein in that they serve as an attempt to remold institutions that do not currently meet
the needs of the people they were meant to serve. Attempts at building democracy in Africa
have produced mixed results. For example, professor Young notes that
the coalescence of forces demanding democratization is so powerful, and
the residual legitimacy of incumbent autocracies so shallow, that in nearly
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ingly, this paper will explore the possibilities of reconstructing socie-
ties in a context where central governmental institutions are largely
defunct An example of this mode of institution building may cur-
rently be taking place in Somaliland, an unrecognized entit that is
emerging from the ashes of what was once northern Somalia. Since
unilaterally declaring its independence from the Republic of Soma-
lia, Somaliland has rebuilt institutions on the basis of Somali cultural
norms. While this process has not rigidly adhered to the interna-
tional legal community's recent exhortations regarding democracy,'
it appears to be an attempt to forge institutions that are firmly
grounded in twenty-first century Somali culture and, therefore, are
more accountable to the Somali people.
The process unfolding in Somaliland challenges the international
community to expand its concept and understanding of democracy,
which is currently understood to embody merely periodic elections,
separation of powers, judicial review and the promotion of the rule of
law. It raises the question of whether the international legal com-
all cases some form of transition is in prospect. ... Any number of obsta-
des stand in the way of a pluralized state capable of managing an expand-
ing economy. Indeed, two transitions of the present generation have al-
ready aborted (Sudan in 1989, Algeria in 1992). In Sudan, a military
regime of unusually ruthless character, subordinated to elements of the
National Islamic Front (NIF), swept away an elected government discred-
ited by its indecisiveness and inability to end the ciil uwr; in Algeria. the
military struck preemptively to block an electoral sweep by the Front Is-
lamique de Salut (FIS).
Crawford Young, Democratization in Africa: The Contradictions of a Political Imperalt, in Eco\o.tc
CHANGE, supra, at 230, 241. Young notes that while military take-overs are not new, what has
changed is that armies from the periphery have succeeded in overturning incumbent regimes
in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Rvanda, Chad, and now, Zaire. See idL On May 25, 1997. a mili-
tary coup d'etat in Sierra Leone overthrew the elected democratic government. Se Cesar Che-
lala, Automatic Shunning Could Deter Mlitary Coups4 NEWSDAY, June 10, 1997, at A42. 'After 34
years of independence, three new constitutions, and halfa dozen military coups, Nigeria has yet
to develop a stable system of government...." Wdl-oiled, but Still Creaking, THE FIN. TL Es, July
14, 1994, at 24. An army captain led a coup in Gambia in 1994, rebels invading from Uganda
took over Rwanda that same year, and rebels overthrew the government of Zaire, renaming it
Congo, in 1997. One West African opposition politician stated that he was afraid 'that the les-
son to be drawn from Zaire [Congo], Rwanda, and Gambia is that violence works - that it's the
only way to change these pseudo-democratic regimes." Ben Barber, Clinton Accentuates the Pam-
tive in Africa Policy; U.S. Supports Neu, Democratic Leaden, WASHINGTON TIMES, June 20, 1997, at
Al.
, See infra notes 282-327 and accompanying texL The disintegration of Somalia may be at-
tributed to a number of factors, but the immediate cause was the culmination of a prolonged
and particularly cruel dvil ar that destroyed the major apparatuses of government. See, e.g.,
Hussein M. Adam, Somalia: A Terrible Beaut, Being Born?, in COLLsED STATES: THE
DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITLMATE AUTHOR'y 69 (. William Zartman ed.,
1995).
'See Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law In Developmetil On Tapping, Gourdmg and Semng Palm-
Wine, 29 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L 167, 230 (1997) (analyzing the different forms of governance
from patrimonialism to electoral politics and their respective levels of accountability).
6 But seeThomas K. Franck, TheDemocraticEntitlement, 29 U. RICH. L REv. 1 (1994).
Professor Franck formulates a modem view of democracy, which takes into account com-
mon deviations from absolute democracy: "Absolute democracy... is a condition of power-
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munities' universalist view of democracy should be broadened and
whether constitutions, which provide the structure for democracy,
might be viewed from more diverse and expansive perspectives.
With these objectives in mind, I would like to pose the idea of "grow-
ing constitutions."" Constitutions can flourish and succeed only if
they are firmly planted in the cultural soil from which they gain le-
gitimacy. Thus, growing constitutions embodies the not so novel idea
that constitutions and laws should reflect and be derived from the
cultural norms in which they must endure.9 Constitutions that are
validation which no society - not even cantonal Swiss plebiscitary governance - embodies to-
tally, to the exclusion of all counterveiling considerations. Every democracy compromises
democratic theory in socio-political practice." I& at 4. Democracy and "democratic entitle-
ment" represent a "rebuttable presumption" that is satisfied so long as deviations from tile
norm are standards which are commonly accepted as necessary and proper in a free society
(i.e., restrictions in time of war or other public emergency). See id. at 5. "(T]he democratic
entitlement creates a presumption in favor of governance by the free, equal, and secret expres-
sion of popular will." Id. (italics in original). "'Democracy,' etymologically speaking, is all
about the role of people in governance. It is about the right to be consulted when political
choices need to be made. It is an idea as old as the Athenian polis, or the gathering of African
elders around the village Baobab tree." Id. at 6.
7 The language of modem constitutionalism was designed to exclude or to assimilate cul-
tural diversity and to justify uniformity. See JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPUCITY:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY 58 (1995). The modem constitution is presumed
to emulate the following pattern: At the center is a sovereign people who exist prior to the con-
stitution. "By a self-conscious act of reflective reason and agreement, the people give rise to a
constitution which 'constitutes' the political association. The constitution lays down the fun-
damental laws which establish the form of government, the rights and duties of citizens, the
representative and institutional relation between government and governed, and an amending
formula." Id. at 59. Tully cites Rene Descartes as inferring "that it would be 'unreasonable for
an individual to plan to reform a state by changing it from the foundations up and overturning
it in order to set it up again.' He therefore concludes that in politics it is better to accommo-
date the assemblage of customs and ways of the people than to radically reform them." Id. at
102.
8 Professor Tully defines "constitution" as follows: "A modem constitution is an act whereby
a people frees itself (or themselves) from custom and imposes a new form of association on it-
self by an act of will, reason and agreement. An ancient constitution, in contrast, is the recog-
nition of how the people are already constituted by their assemblage of fundamental laws, insti-
tutions and customs." Id. at 60.
Professor Nwabueze posits that "[n]ormally, a constitution is a formal document having
the force of law, by which a society organises a government for itself, defines and limits its pow-
ers, and prescribes the relations of its various organs inter se, and with the citizen." B.O.
NWABUEZE, CONSTITrTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 2 (1973). The liberal concept of
constitutionalism rests on two assumptions: limited government and individual rights. Other
concepts, such as accountability of government through periodic elections, separation of pow-
ers and the rule of law, ultimately revolve around these foundational concepts. See Issa G.
Shivji, State and Constitutionalism: A New Democratic Perspectiv in STATE AND CONSTITUTIONAUSM:
AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 27,28 (Issa G. Shivji, ed. 1991).
Professor Chibundu contends that
the relevance of law for development must be grounded in the experiences
of the society under study and in ways giving form and meaning to those
experiences by their institutionalization, not through internationalizing
the societies, nor through a universalist or global conception of procedural
mechanisms or substantive rights and duties.
Chibundu, supra note 5, at 171. Professor Tully adds that
[a] constitution should be seen as a form of activity, an intercultural dia-
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not firmly grounded in the cultural mores of the society in which they
operate are destined to fail, become irrelevant, or be reshaped and
adapted to meet the needs of the culture and society in which they
are situated. Indeed, most postcolonial constitutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa have largely succumbed to irrelevance and debacle."
Home-grown constitutions are not a call for a return to idealized
and romantic preconceptions of culture or what is sometimes termed
"tradition."" Cultures are extraordinarily complex, are in constant
flux, and change as they interact with and are affected by other cul-
tures and peoples. Consequently, the impact of colonialism, in its
various guises, on the myriad indigenous African cultures that were
encountered by Europeans cannot be ignored or denied,'2 and the
concomitant distortion of "tradition" by colonial rulers and their corn-
logue in which the culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary
societies negotiate agreements on their forms of association over time in
accordance with the three conventions of mutual recognition, consent and
cultural continuity.
TULLY, supra note 7, at 30.
10 See Isaac L Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Afnea: A RawhLimn Approach,
41 ST. Louis U. UJ. 1301, 1303-05 (1997). "Independence constitutions, drafted by the techni-
cians of decolonization and keenly scrutinized by African leaders, have repeatedly been
squeezed to death between the rising expectations of the new citizens and te ambitions of suc-
cessor elites to advance the interests of their kinsmen, their clients or themselves." JOHN D.
HARGREAVES, DECOLONIZATION IN AFRIcA 250 (1996). 'IT]he post-colonial state has recentlb
collapsed in Liberia, Rivanda, and Somalia. Others, such as Zaire. Nigeria. Sudan, Mozarn-
bique, Angola, Ethiopia, and Kenya maintain a precarious balance on the political precipice."
Mfakau wa Mutua, 111y Redrawz the Map of Aftica: A Moral and Lgal Inquiry, 16 Mc.J. INT'L L
1113, 1116 (1995).
n Culture can be defined as a set of rules, which are "largely taci and unconscious, that
structure our social interaction and at another level the values that underlie those rules and
give them - and our actions - meaning." Stephen A. Marglin, Towards the Dtc!oniatwn of the
Mind, in DOMINATING KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT, CULTURF, AND REsISTN CE 124 (Frederique
Apffel Marglin & Stephen A. Marglin eds., 1990). Professor Marglin goes further and finds that
culture consists of different ways of knowing and is composed of many systems of kno-ledge:
[A] knowledge system is defined in terms of four characteristics: epistemol-
ogy, transmission, innovation and power. Each system has its own theory of
knowledge (or epistemology), its own rules for sharing knowledge, its own
distinctive -ays for changing the content of what counts as knowledge, and
finally, its owrn political rules for governing relationships both among in-
siders to any particular knowledge system and between insiders and outsid-
ers.
Id. at 24. Professor Tully notes that one of the oldest conventions of modem constitutionalism
is that every culture worthy of recognition is a nation and every nation should be recognized as
an independent nation state. TULLY, supra note 7, at 2.
12 By the same token, the European imagination was profoundly affected by the colonial
encounter. EDWARD W. SAID, CULTUREAND LMPERIAU1SM (1994).
We are at a point in our work when we can no longer ignore empires and
the imperial context in our studies. To speak... of 'the propaganda for
an expanding empire [which] created illusions of security and false expec-
tations that high returns would accrue to those who invested beyond its
boundaries' is in effect to speak of an atmosphere created by both empire
and novels, by racial theory and geographical speculation, by the concept
of national identity and urban (or rural) routine.
Id. at 6.
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pradors must be fully taken into account' i3 Nor can we negate the im-
pact of the modem world, where advances in communication and
transportation connect communities in heretofore unimaginable
ways, or deny cultural adaptations of concepts that have helped socie-
ties organize and govern themselves. Nevertheless, the insistence that
only Western frameworks are legitimate and that certain constitu-
tional and institutional structures are superior and applicable to all
societies, albeit with some tinkering around the fringes, is problem-
atic at best and disastrous at worst. Constitutions, laws, and institu-
tions are best created from the bottom up rather than the top down."
At the bottom of a culture are the complex norms and relationships
that bind people together, and through which they function as a so-
ciety. It is at this level that we should begin to grow any constitution.'6
In examining this question, I will begin by very briefly exploring
the idea of State collapse and how and why it transpired in Somalia.
While the immediate cause of the collapse of central institutions was
civil war, this paper will explore whether other systemic causes,
grounded in postcolonial systems, ultimately proved unsuitable to
meet the needs and demands of the Somali people and thus, ulti-
mately were responsible for collapse. Accordingly, the discussion will
begin with a general examination of colonial governing structures in
sub-Saharan Africa and the extent to which they continued to be util-
ized in the postcolonial era to mold and develop postcolonial institu-
tions, constitutions and political systems. The intermeshing of colo-
nial and postcolonial institutions and how postcolonial leaders
operated within these institutions will then be analyzed.
This inquiry reveals that constitutionalism has had a troubled his-
tory in sub-Saharan Africa, in part because the postcolonial order was
usually built on foreign paradigms that had little or no foundation in
the myriad cultures of the peoples they were to govern. Postcolonial
institutions were prescribed on top of the still-existing coercive and
anti-democratic structures of the colonial era. When considered
is For a brilliant analysis of the invention of tradition with respect to customary law, see L.
Amede Obiora, New Skin, Old Wine: (En)gaging Nationalism, Traditionalism, and Gender Relations,
28 IND. L. REv. 575 (1995).
14 SeeTULLY, supra note 7, at 9. "[Cloncepts of the people, popular sovereignty, citizenship,
unity, equality, recognition and democracy all tend to presuppose the uniformity of a nation
state with a centralised and unitary system of legal and political institutions." Id.
15 See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 2, at 907. See also MariJ. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. G.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). Professor
Matsuda has articulated a theory that explains why scholars should listen to those who are pow-
erless and often ignored: "[T]hose who have experienced discrimination speak with a special
voice to which we should listen." Id. at 324. It is not sufficient for the academic philosopher to
imagine life as lived by the African people, they must study the "actual experience, history, cul-
ture, and intellectual tradition" of the people. Id. at 385. "[N]otions of right and wrong,justice
and injustice, [should be] examined not from an abstract position but from the position of
groups who have suffered through history...." Id. at 325.
Growing a constitution will require the ability to change our perspective. See TULLY, supra
note 7, at 25-26.
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alongside the immense poverty and meager economic prospects in-
herited at decolonization, postcolonial constitutions, in retrospect,
appear to have been doomed to fail from the outset. Finally, I will
turn to how we might grow constitutions that are firmly planted in
the cultural soil within which they must grow and flourish. It is from
there, I believe, that viable constitutions begin and endure. To the
extent possible, Somalia and Somaliland will be used as the backdrop
to this discussion.1
7
I. "FAILED STATES" AND THE BREAKDOWN OF
CENTRAL AUTHORrIY IN SOMALIA
The concept of failed, collapsed or disintegrating states is a rela-
tively new and contested' 8 phenomenon in international legal dis-
course.'9 It can be defined as a situation where the government is
unable to discharge basic -9overnmental functions with respect to its
populace and its territory. Consequently, laws are not made, cases
are not decided, order is not preserved and societal cohesion deterio-
rates.2' Basic services such a medical care, education, infrastructure
maintenance, tax collection and other functions and services ren-
17 Somaliland has yet to be recognized by any State or by the organs of the United Nations,
although the Republics of Djibouti and Ethiopia are considering recognition which would forge
and strengthen growing trade links. See Saad S. Noor, The United States should recognize So.
maliland's independenc, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 14, 1998, at D6. While attention has contin-
ued to focus on famine and violence in the rest of Somalia, conditions in Somaliland have at-
tracted little attention. There is a paucity of current information on Somaliland and it has been
difficult to obtain data and statistics. Whether this is because it is unrecognized (and thus, non-
existent) for many agencies, or because outside organizations are being denied access, is un-
known.
is See Henry Richardson II, "Failed States, ' Sdf-Dtermination, and Preawtive Dip loacy: Co!oni-
alist Nostalgia and DemocraticExpedations, 10 TEM_-P. INT'L& COmP. LJ. 1 (1996); Ch ibundu, supra
note 5, at 230.
'9 See genera!), Anne Orford, Locating the Internationa" Militayt and Monenar lnterentzons after
the Cold War, 38 HARV. INT'L LJ. 443 (Spring 1997); Amy E. Eckert, United Nations Peatheeping in
Collapsed States, 5J. INT'L L & PRAC. 273 (Summer 1996); Ruth E. Gordon, Hur.anitanan Inter-
vention by the United Nations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti4 31 TE.N. INT'L LJ. 43 (Winter 1996) [here-
inafter Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention]; A. Peter Mutharika, The Ro!e of the United ,atrons
Security Council in African Peace Management" Some Proposals, 17 MICH. J. IN.%T'L L 537 (Winter
1996); Shaendra D. Sharma, Africa's Developmental Challenges: Bawteen Despair and Hope, 20 SPG
FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 165 (Winter/Spring 1996) (book review): Harold Hong&u Koh, A
World Tranfomed, 20 YALEJ. INT'L L IX (Summer 1995); Mutua, supra note 10; Gordon, Sowe
Legal Problems, supra note 2; A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of nternational Law in the Twenty-Fnt
Century: An Afiican Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INr'L LJ. 1706 (May 1995); Ruth E. Gordon. United
Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and Beyond, 15 MNfid.J. IN'"L L 519 (Win-
ter 1994) [hereinafter Gordon, United Nations]; Benjamin R. Barber, Gleal Drv..racy or G!cbat
Law: Which Comes First?, 1 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (Fall, 1993); Gerald B. Helman &
Steven R Ratner, SavingFailed States, 89 FOREIGN POL'Y 3 (1992).
20 See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 2, at 913-16 (defining 'failed states"). Interest-
ingly, state collapse has not been alleged with respect to the external functions of states deemed
"failed." See Chibundu, supra note 5, at 230 (noting the capacity of postcolonial states to man-
age their external relations).
2 Seeid.
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dered by central governing authorities cease to exist or exist only in
limited areas.22  State collapse may come in the wake of civil war,"
widespread genocide or simply a steadily-disintegrating ability to
provide basic needs in such fundamental areas as nutrition, housing,
medical care and education.25 Other theories explaining state col-
lapse in Africa have focused on unsustainable borders and polities,
created in the wake of decolonization, and the myriad deficiencies of
newly-decolonized states.26 In Somalia, the immediate cause of disin-
tegration was undoubtedly a prolonged and bloody civil war waged
against the regime of Mohammed Siad Barre, which eventually de-
generated into a civil war between clan-based rebel groups.27 Loss of
the Ogaden War in 1978 led to a huge influx of refugees,28 an up-
surge in clan tensions, and the beginning of an armed insurrection
against Siad's regime.2 By the end of the decade, the official econ-
See Gordon, Some Legal Problems, supra note 2, at 306-07.
23 Somalia, Afghanistan, and Liberia are often cited as examples of states that have "failed"
in the wake of civil war. See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implicationsfor
International Law, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 18 (1997); Thomas G. Weiss, The UN's Preven-
tion Pipe-Dream, 14 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 423, 424-26 (1996) (noting a widespread "epidemic" of
civil wars).
24 In Rwanda, approximately 500,000 people out of a total population of 7.8 million were
killed in ethnic massacres. Another 2.6 million were displaced within Rwanda and another 2.6
million fled to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. See Gordon, Humanitarian Intervention, supra note
19, at 44 n.7.
Jon H. Sylvester, Sub-Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration, and the Spec-
ter of Recolonization, 27 Loy. L.A L. REV. 1299, 1311 (1994) [hereinafter Sylvester, Sub-Saharan
Africa] (noting that when an economy fails to provide the most rudimentary standard of living
in terms of nutrition, housing, medical care and education, government failure cannot be far
behind). See alsoJon H. Sylvester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for
Equitably Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 258, 259
(1992) (discussing Africa's severe economic problems); Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note
2, at 916-19.
26 See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note 2, at 917-18 (discussing the shortcomings of
newly decolonized states).
27 See Eckert, supra note 19, at 283 (noting that the 1991 collapse of Siad's regime plunged
Somalia into anarchy, civil war, and violence). "Siad played upon divisions within Somali society
to solidify his authority." Id. He manipulated clan loyalties, repressed political opposition and
supported blatant corruption for two decades. "Eventually, inter-clan rivalry, corruption within
the regime, and weariness of Siad's repressive dictatorship erupted into civil war." Id. at 284.
The Ogaden war was undertaken partly because of pressure from Barre's maternal clan
family, the Ogaden, which pushed for intervention in Ethiopia to assist Ogadeni Somalis. The
war resulted in Somalia's overwhelming defeat in 1978, and an ensuing influx of Ogadeni refu-
gees. loan Lewis &James Mayall, Somalia, in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM: 1991-1994, 104 (James
Mayall ed., 1996).
29 The armed insurrection against Siad Barre's regime began with an abortive coup by pre-
dominantly Mijerteyn (Darod) officers in April, 1978 . The Mijerteyn opposition formed the
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), while the Isaq clan formed the Somali National
Movement (SNM). Id. The war in the northeast and northwest regions was carried out largely
from bases in Ethiopia. The north was increasingly subjected to harsh military rule as Siad
bribed and armed "friendly clans to attack his enemies." Id. at 105. Pressure from human
rights activists, who were "appalled at the ferocious suppression of northern dissidents," led to
the termination of most aid by 1990. Id. The fighting eventually eroded the strength of Siad's
forces, which increasingly came to be dominated by his own clansmen. Id.
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omy, which was based largely on the export of livestock from the
North, was disintegrating and the civil service had virtually ceased to
function.ss By the time Siad Barre was finally dislodged from Moga-
dishu,31 Somalia had already disintegrated into its traditional clan
segments 2 "[T]he bitter fighting with modern weapons which
wrought death and suffering on a scale never experienced in the
past, [and] [t]he scale of ensuing clan-cleansing in Mogadishu and
elsewhere was unprecedented."s Power sharing proved to be impos-
sible, and a protracted bloodbath followed in Mogadishu. Fierce
fighting outside Mogadishu spread devastation and starvation
throughout southern Somalia. In sum, Somalia, as Somalia, ceased to
exist.
Yet, perhaps civil war was only the last chapter in a long chronicle
toward Somali statelessness. The demise of Somalia may have begun
with the colonization of Somalia in the 1880s,H and the penultimate
so "The official economy, based primarily on the export of livestock from the war-torn north
was collapsing," while banana exports from southern plantations had already "dwindled into
insignificance through a mixture of incompetence and corruption. Still paid at essentially the
same rates as in the 1960s, before the years of hyperinflation, the cil service had virtualv
ceased to function by the end of the decade." I&
S1 Siad was dislodged by USC forces of the Hawiy clans, led by General Aideed. Id& The
Hawiye had lived in relative peace with Siad Barre's regime until the formation of the United
Somali Congress (USC) in March, 1989. The Haiiye clan us the mainstay of the Mogadishu
business community, and was the largest clan in Mogadishu. This business community desired
a new government, "as the economy spiraled towards total collapse." JAMA MOtLvtED GHALIB,
THE COST OF DIcTATORSHIP: THE SOMALI EXPERIENCE 193 (1995). As the Barre regime degen-
erated, a caucus of Hawiye elders was secretly established in Mogadishu in early 1988. It began
to organize, both in and out of the country, with the goal of preparing Haiye sub-drans for in-
surection and a bid for power. See i&L In 1989, Siad Barres regime began to disintegrate as
international pressure mounted and economic aid dwvindled. I&. at 201. USC forces began cos-
ing in on Siad's forces in December, 1990 and fighting did not cease until Siad Bare fled on
January26,1991. Seeid.at210-11.
The volatile relationship between clan republics emanated primarily from Darod hegem-
ony. After Siad Barre fled, his son-in-law, Ahmed Suciman, struggled to organize a Darod-basd
armed civilian militia. He encountered some success among Dolbahnate, Mijertein and related
clansmen, although the Ogaden and other Darod refused to fight on the side of the dying re-
gime against the USC. lId at 211. Unfortunately, this triggered a phase in the civil %ar that led
to Darod-Hawiye ethnic retribution, which ultimately had serious and far-reaching conse-
quences. See id.
Siad's huge arsenal, which largely fell into the hands of various clan militia, was supple-
mented by equipment from the demobilized Ethiopian army across the border, and by continu-
ing arms imports from Kenya. See Leiwis & Mayall, supm note 28, at 106.
Id. at 105-06.
These conditions also led to massive intervention by the international community under
the auspices of the United Nations and the United States. See Gordon, United Nations, supra
note 19, at 553. Although the United Nations did succeed in preventing mass starvation, the
broader aims of this intervention were ultimately unsuccessful. Set id. at 556-57.MSee, eg., TERRENCE LYONS & AH.MED I. SAMATAP, So.ALIA: STATE COLLPSE,
MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION, AND STRATEGIES FOR POLmCAL REco.srRtcnoN 11 (1995).
The British first occupied the port of Aden in Yemen in 1839-40 and signed formal agreements
with representatives of a number of major kin groups to make northern Somalia an official pro-
tectorate in 1886. The French arrived around the same time as the British. and the Italians
formally established their colony in 1893. Id.
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chapter in its collapse may have begun with attempts to make Somali
political culture fit within the Western image of modern government.
This effort was typical of colonial and postcolonial rule in sub-
Saharan Africa. Indigenous cultures and institutions were largely ig-
nored as parliamentary-style democracy was thrust upon newly-
emerging nations. Moreover, the underlying legacy of colonial insti-
tutions and mechanisms, which would ultimately undermine nation-
alist efforts, remained. Thus, perhaps it is here that the international
community should begin to understand the problem and propose so-
lutions.
II. COLONIAL INTENTIONS, PRETENSIONS AND
INSTITUTIONS
A. Introduction
Any discussion of the impact of the colonial state on postcolonial
governance must acknowledge the difficulties inherent in such an
expansive enterprise. The diverse nature of Africa's colonial experi-
ences, and "the extraordinary diversity of Africa's peoples and its cul-
tures" makes quantifying the colonial state both complex and diffi-
cult.ss Sub-Saharan Africa's colonial experience has been classified by
one scholar 9 as encompassing three broad categories: colonial trade• 40 4
economies, concession mining colonies,4' and settler plantation
colonies.2 Each of these models confronted different cultures and
37 This author has advocated basing solutions within the culture and mores of those people
that the international community is trying to assist. See Gordon, Saving Failed States, supra note
2, at 971-74.
SO KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER'S HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CuLTuRE 24-25 (1992).
39 Id. at 163 (quoting Samir Amin, a "leading African political economist and director of the
Third World Forum").
40 Colonial possessions such as the Gold Coast (present day Ghana) were part of the colonial
trade economy. Tropical agricultural products (i.e. cocoa, palm oil, and coffee) formed the
basis of an export-oriented agricultural economy that was primarily concentrated in West Af-
rica, where mineral reserves were believed to be insignificant. For these colonies, with agricul.
tural cash crops as an integral part of the economy, government financing became a matter of
appropriating agricultural surpluses. After independence, production was not nationalized.
Marketing was effected through such mechanisms as national marketing boards that had been
purchasing and trading monopolies and supervised state extraction of money from the agricul-
tural economy. "In theory the surplus generated by this monopsony was to be used to finance
development; in practice it went to the cities." Id.
41 French-speaking Central Africa, now present day Gabon, the Central African Republic,
Congo, and Zaire, where limited populations and difficult climates made agricultural produc-
tion unlikely, was dominated by concession-owning companies. Id. Concessionary companies
that dealt in timber, rubber, and ivory practiced a particularly brutal form of exploitation, In-
vesting as little as possible in these colonies insured that there were no local surpluses and little
in the way of Western education for native populations. (For example, at independence there
were three Africans among the top 4700 civil servants in Zaire). Id.
42 The "Africa of the labor reserves" included "the settler plantation economies of German
Tanganyika, Kenya, Rhodesia, and the whole of Africa south of Zaire... In these areas societies
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left varying legacies.4 European penetration varied both ithin and
between communities, and the extent to which European cultural
norms intruded upon and changed indigenous African cultures is
both complex and widely contested by scholars." Thus, to the extent
this paper generalizes about "Africa," it must be acknowledged that
this analysis must to some extent be flawed.4' While the focus on So-
malia is intended to ameliorate this weakness, it must nonetheless be
were radically disrupted by the institution of new, massive, and not-alays-voluntary migration
to the mines and plantations." The availability of African labor was crucial, and virtually all op-
erations, both agrarian and mineral, were labor intensive. "In parts of Senegal. Upper Guinea.
the French Soudan, and Niger, as well as northern Nigeria, the proportion of slaves in the
populations was very large - a third or more. Early administrators were well aare their corvee
requisitions would not be met without accepting the provision of conscripts who were in reality
slaves." RICHARD L ROBERTS, WARRIORS, MERCHANTS, AND SLAVES: THE STATE AND THE
ECONOMY IN THE MIDDLE NIGER VALLEY, 1700-1914 at 174 (1987). "Most local administrators
were convinced that the end of slavery would mean economic and political chaos." Id.
Mutua, supra note 10, at 1142, 1166 (discussing how colonial powers divided Africa into
spheres of influence, establishing a legacy of and laying the groundwork for, many present-day
conflicts). See also Sylvester, Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 25, at 1305-07.
'See APPIAH, supra note 38, at 173-74. "The cultural life of most of black Africa remained
largely unaffected by European ideas until the last years of the nineteenth century, and most
cultures began our own century with ways of life formed very tittle by direct contact with
Europe." IK at 173. "Deliberate attempts at change (through missionary activity or the estab-
lishment of Western schools) and unintended influence (through contact ith explorers and
colonizers in the interior, and trading posts on the coasts) produced small enclaves of Europe-
anized Africans. But the major cultural impact of Europe is largely a product of the period
since the First World War." Id. at 174. With respect to the institutions introduced by colonial-
ism,
[i]ncredible as it may sound to many, the colonialists did not really intro-
duce any new institutions into Africa. What they introduced were merely
the more efficient forms of already existing institutions - both good and
bad. It was probably for this reason that colonialism lasted for nearly a
century. Had it introduced institutions which were diametrically antitheti-
cal to the existing ones, the demise of colonialism would have come
sooner.
GEORGE B. N. AVIITEY, INDIGENOUS AFRICAN INSTITITIONS 439 (1991). On the other hand,
Professor Mboya finds that
[t]he appearance of colonialism in East Africa meant that another set of
political institutions was superimposed on the traditional arrangements.
While the new set was in many ways distinct from the old in the sense that
Africans, even in the later years, had only very limited participation in the
political system, the new institutional arrangement did affect the tradi-
tional system. In the first place constraints were imposed which reduced
the political power and freedom of the tribe. Second. the political organi-
zation of the tribe was often utilized to administer and enforce decisions
which were in fact made by colonial authorities. Finally, and as a result of
the first two points, the African felt less and less a participant in the politi-
cal process and naturally resented the imposition of outside authority.
TomJ. Mboya, The Impact of Modem Institutions on the East Afican, in TRADITION AND TR%.NsIo.
IN EASTAFRICA STUDIES OF THE TRIBAL ELEMENT IN THE MODERN ERA 89,92 (P. H. Gulliver ed.,
1969) [hereinafter TRADrrIoN AN) TRANsmoN].
Given the diversity of the precolonial histories of the peoples of Africa and the complexi-
ties of the colonial experience, it is difficult to discern what is 'African" and the extent to which
we can discuss "Africa." SeeAPPAH, supra note 38, at 24-26 (noting the diversity of African cul-
tures and communities, and the varied nature of colonial regimes).
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admitted that generalizations by definition do not always conform to
the particular. Nonetheless, there are enough similarities in the Afri-
can colonial and postcolonial experiences to support some generali-
46zations.
Decolonization was generally the end result of negotiations be-
tween African elites and colonial governments4' rather than a conse-
quence of revolution or armed struggle.4 s This had a direct impact
on the institutions left standing at independence and on subsequent
obstacles to forging a "nation," an entity which generally emerges
from the shared experience of fighting for independence or from a49
sense of a shared history or culture. In much of Africa, however,
"the transition to independence was generally smooth and unevent-
46 The meaning of the term "postcolonial" has been the subject of ongoing debate. SeeANIA
LOOMBA, COLONIALISM / POSTCOLONIALIsM 7 (1998).
47 As the colonial state began to slowly contemplate decolonization, it became apparent that
chiefs - "however faithful they had been as executants of the colonial will" - could not be the
leaders of the states that would emerge. CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 199 (1994). By the end of the Second World WVar, colonial offices
presumed that new forms of local government would be required. These new forms of gov-
ernment would be based on elected councils that would offer access to a younger generation
with some education who, by this point, were uncomfortable with customary institutions. Id.
"The new policy was applied with energy, particularly by a new generation of district officers not
tied by habit and inclination to their chiefly allies and auxiliaries." One British report noted
that
all the District Councils made it plain that they [were] bent upon reaching
the status of a native state ... [which] aim[ed] [for] Home Rule ....
Moreover, it seem[ed] to them that this [was] the logical development of
past administrative policy. A civil society was taking form, with which state
agents had to relate through a political process rather than a command hi-
erarchy.
Id. at 200.
48 See Chibundu, supra note 5, at 232 ("What is remarkable about most post-colonial African
states is not the level of... violence, or political strife ... but the relative absence of these ele-
ments."). Exceptions include the liberation movements against Portuguese rule in Mozam-
bique, Angola, and Guinea Bissau, and of course the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa.
See generally HARGREAVES, supra note 10, at 228, 244. There were few preparations made by the
Portuguese government to terminate their colonial control prior to the Portugese revolution in
1974. By that time, however, the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea
Bissau had made impressive progress. Id. Paradoxically, the process of nation-building simul-
taneously revived ethnic identities because the "revolutionary consciousness of local communi-
ties could only be raised from within their traditional culture and by people who spoke their
lanpuage ...." Id. at 232.
See Mutua, supra note 10, at 1114-15. The concept of self-determination necessitates iden-
tifying groups entitled to exercise this right.
In sub-Saharan Afica... these groups are not now, and never were, accu-
rately identified by the borders drawn by European colonial powers ....
The artificial nature of these boundaries contributes substantially to "in-
ternal" conflicts now taking place in many sub-Saharan countries. Moreo-
ver, even as the colonial boundaries planted the seeds for much of the pre-
sent "internal" conflict, they did much to destroy, or at least to retard, the
efficacy of the indigenous local and regional systems and institutions -
economic, political, and legal - that might have been bases for sustained
development.
Sylvester, Sub-Saharan Africa, supra note 25, at 1319.
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ful.",o Indeed, colonial administrators helped shape independence
constitutions and national institutions, thus raising questions regard-
ing their legitimacy and later, their acceptance by both the elites and
the population as a whole."' These instruments incorporated some of
the demands of nationalist leaders but also imported foreign ideals
and models.' Consequently, independence did not portend a com-
plete break from colonial political values any more than it simply
continued those interests.53 This dichotomy partly accounts for the
attempt to superimpose liberal, western constitutional values, which
were themselves foreign and only half-heartedly accepted, over highly
undemocratic and bureaucratic administrative structures left over
5O NAOMI CHAZAN ETAL, PoLIncs AND SOCiml Iw CO.,Thm.POR Am %I 45 (1992).
Where the notion of African self-rule w-as contested (iusophone Africa. the
settler societies of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Algeria), the quest for
liberation took on violent forms that were usually accompanied by frag-
mentation within the national liberation movements. In these instances.
the internal struggle for power coincided with the continued contestation
with recalcitrant imperialist powers.
Id. at 44. For a discussion of the harsh nature of decolonization in East Africa where there wer
large settler communities, see BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN A Fras A SOCLL XtD POLTILL
HISTORY 142-54 (1994) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA].
5' See Dore, supra note 10, at 1304 ("[T] he architects of post-colonial governments in Africa
were the very same colonial authorities who had maintained nondemocratic governments
there."). Professor Dore questions whether colonial authorities who were illegitimate rulers
could organize a tenable transition to a democratic form of government He notes that i[tlhe
imperfections of post-colonial constitutions were in part a reflection of the fact that those %sho
prepared the colonies for independence were themselves not democratic and largely ignorant
of or insensitive to the prevailing social and cultural dynanics of the societies they had colo-
nized." Id
52 SeeYOUNG, supra note 47, at 209-10 (discussing the emergence of democracy as an mstru-
mental preference during decolonization).
53 See CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 43. Similarly, Davidson notes that at the heart o Af-
rica's institutional crisis was
the very nationalism, or nation-statism, which the pioneers of anti-colonkil
liberation had used as their necessary instnmient of change. Instead of
building new states from the foundation-culture of Africa's pre-coloial
states, Africa had tried to build new states from the foundation-culture of
colonial states, a very different thing. So independence had not been able
to join Africa to its own history and tradition. Independence, in practice.
had come to mean a continuation of Africa's subjection to others, it had
come to mean another period of alienation from Africa's living roots and
self-belieL ...
This structure of ideas and of power-distribution u.s easy to see and
define. It consisted in the kind of state that had emerged from the colo-
nial state at the time of independence: a kind of state that claimed to be an
African independent state but ims, in practice and in power-distribution.
closely modelled on the colonial state.... [T]he fifty-odd colonies into
which the imperialist powers had divided Africa became, after these powers
withdrew or were driven out, fifty-odd African states within ie same fron-
tiers as before, and governed, often and essentially, in the same unys as be-
fore: except, of course, that the governors now were no longer European.
butAfrican.
DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA, supra note 50, at 262-63.
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from the colonial era.4 Ultimately, the imported democratic ideals
were discarded in favor of concentrating power in an executive who
also controlled the administrative apparatus.-
Imperialist policies compelled nationalist leaders to seek inde-
pendence within existing political units, i.e., within extant colonial
borders, rather than a "more rational or historically logical territorial
unit."56 With that concession, any subsequent reorganization of the
territorial map became difficult, if not completely impossible.
7
Moreover, the colonial administrative units had been created in a
haphazard fashion and "lacked the social solidarity or consensus nec-
essary to engender a sense of nationhood" ....'s It is questionable
whether these units actually constituted nations when they emerged
as sovereign states.59 At independence, it is more likely that Europe
5 The essence of terminal colonial politics was the implanting of fragile
graftings of a constitutional polity onto the robust trunk of colonial autoc-
racy.... [Iln most countries the experimental life of a truly civil polity
prior to transfer of sovereignty was too brief to override the more enduring
heritage of the colonial state, its bureaucratic autocracy animated by its vo-
cation of domination.
YOUNG, supra note 47, at 217.
55 See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text.
56 BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN: AFRICA AND THE CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE
183 (1992) [hereinafter DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN]. Some leading national move-
ments, such as the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, which sought
independence and then federation, argued for regional or sub-regional configurations, but
nothing came of these visions. Id at 183-84. See also Mutua, supra note 10, at 1113-19.
5 See DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN, supra note 56, at 184 (discussing failed national-
ist movements). Similarly, Hargreaves notes that
[t] he French grouped some of these building-blocks into quasi-federations,
and the British made some attempts to do likewise; African leaders, with
more passion, advocated wider, even continental unities; but with a few lo-
cal exceptions (Tanzania, Somalia, Cameroun), colonial boundaries
proved to have hardened prematurely into state frontiers. Decolonizers
undertook to build nations to fill these matrices; African leaders eagerly
accepted the challenge, hoping to use their local 'political kingdoms' as
steps towards visions of continental freedom. The outcome of this dia-
logue was to legitimize the independence of more than forty nation-states,
and to pass the responsibility for 'nation-building' from European to Afri-
can hands. There is little evidence of conspiracy by the former rulers to
"balkanize"; small, weak states would not necessarily prove effective or eas-
ily manageable agents of post-colonial influence. But given the eagerness
of African leaders to secure and exercise power in their immediate political
theatre, even regional regroupings would have required a stronger closing
exercise of imperial authority than any European government was pre-
pared to make.
HARGREAVES, supra note 10, at 250.
58 Dore, supra note 10, at 1304.
19 Perhaps "[tihejubilant crowds celebrating independence were not inspired by a 'national
consciousness' that 'demanded the nation'... [but] by the hope of more and better food and
shelter." DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN, supra note 56, at 185. Popular loyalties to the
new state did not emerge from the urban or rural supporters of the new nations. In the end,
the populace appeared to be seeking food, shelter, health care, and schools rather than a flag
or anthem. Id.
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left Africa with states looking for nations.60  Constitutions, however,
do not operate in a cultural vacuum.6' The lack of a shared sense of
sociopolitical identity meant that people at the grassroots level did
not believe that the institutions created b, their constitutions would
promote justice within their communities.' In addition, "[o]nce the
national sovereignties were declared, the arena was fixed for rivalry
over the resources within that arena... ."3 Postcolonial tribalism
flourished in part because the separatist nation-state model "gave full
rein to elitist rivalries."" Moreover, with separate and rival independ-
ent states, social interests ceased to prevail over the national interest
within the postcolonial dynamic.6a
In the immediate postcolonial era, new governments were con-
fronted with pressures from myriad directions, and these demands
were accompanied by greatly heightened expectations." Govern-
ments were expected to provide social services on a grand scale while
maintaining order in the face of strikes, demonstrations and sponta-
neous actions.67 Their economic role was magnified because gov-
ernments were the gate keepers between external resources and in-
ternal processes. Furthermore, "anti-colonial activists and militants
demanded some tangible returns for their political support during
the crucial years of decolonization."c5 To meet these multifaceted
challenges, most leaders opted to concentrate powers in their owvn
hands and proved to possess little commitment to upholding the pre-
cepts of independence constitutions.69
A synthesis of factors determined how government institutions
60 SeeApPIAH, supra note 38, at 162. Once the opposition to the British ended, the cohesion
that the resistance required became difficult to maintain. The reality of African differences had
been easily hidden due to the level of generality at which Africans opposed the Europeans. The
issue had always been framed in quite general terms: black versus white, ex-subjects versus ex-
masters, traditional versus modern, communitarian versus individualistic, rich versus poor, and
other dichotomies. See id
61 Dore, supra note 10, at 1305.
62 Id
63 DAVIDSON, THE BLAcKMAN's BURDEN, supra note 56, at 185.
rA Id. at 186.
65 See, ag., Chinedu Reginald Ezetah, International Law of S&lf-Dderrmination and the 0gom Ques.
tio Mirroring Afnica ' Post-Colonial Dilemma, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 811. 820621 (1997)
(describing the Ogoniland situation wherein ethnic groups joined to oppose the govecrnment
and protect theirjoint interests, but the government termed it tribal infighting, which then led
to divisions within what had been a united effort).
See CHAzAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 46.
671&
68 Id. See also Steven R Ramer, Draalng a Ber Linet UTI Poasidlis and the Bordr n of Xew
States, 90 ANI. J. INT'L L 590, 595-96 (describing how African and European elites mutually
agreed to replace European rulers with specific indigenous ones). Some postcolonial leaders,
however, would reveal themselves to be as anti-democratic as their European predecessors. Se
id. at 610. "The people's overall right to political participation remained the stated position of
the international community," but whether this objective um genuinely accepted by post-
colonial leaders is questionable. Id.
69 Some new leaders sought to legitimize their daims to power, while others were more con-
cerned with perpetuating their authority at any cost. Se Dore, supra note 10, at 1305-06.
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were reconfigured in most of Africa during the immediate postcolo-
nial era. This reconfiguration was accomplished by two methods:
impedance and facilitation. Participatory institutions inherited from
the colonial and decolonization period were weakened or eliminated
(impedance), while acquired bureaucratic structures were strength-
ened and enlarged (facilitation) . ° Constitutions were changed to
permit permissive amendment, so that government-sponsored politi-
cal and economic changes could be implemented and legal safe-
guards standing in the way of firm control could be discarded.7' The
next two sections will explore the constitutions and political struc-
tures that were adopted and then largely discarded, as well as the in-
stitutions that were inherited and ultimately retained and expanded
upon.
B. The Postcolonial Political Order
English-speaking Africa adopted modified versions of the West-
minster model, complete with bicameral legislatures, separation of
powers, judicial review and a Bill of Rights.7 2 In French-speaking Af-
rica, governments adopted tripartite constitutions that were devel-
oped in the 18th century by Montesquieu.5 While these institutions
were democratic in the western liberal sense, they were not based on
the values and beliefs of the people they were to govern, nor were
they based upon the values of the elites who were to operate within
their framework.74 Rather, they were colonial creations that were
adopted by the African elites as the colonial powers withdrew .7
Rarely were constitutions established with even a modicum of public
participation, such as by referendum or through an assembly elected
specifically for this purpose. 6 Because the populace had little input
in designing or approving these constitutions, the resulting docu-
ments did not command the loyalty, obedience and confidence of the
people. "Having been designed abroad, there was a fundamental
mismatch between the values of the people of Africa and the western
values which inspired the drafters of the new constitutions."77 This
70 CHAZAN Er AL, supra note 50, at 47.
7 See id at 49 (noting that there was a clear message that legal safeguards impeding firm
central control were unacceptable and would be eliminated).
72 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 70. For an extended discussion of the Westminster model
in Nigeria, see NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 55-79.
73 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 9.
74 Id. at 71.
75 Id. Constitutions were also adopted by local legislatures, set up by colonial powers, or ap-
proved under the authority of laws enacted by colonial governments. Even after independence,
legislatures created by the colonial power retained the authority to enact constitutions and did
so in many commonwealth countries in one guise or another. NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 23.
76 NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 23.
77 Dore, supra note 10, at 1304-05. Professor Dore continues:
These socioeconomic values had deep historical roots and evolved only
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misguided attempt to immediately incorporate ideas that had slowly
evolved in foreign cultures was largely unsuccessful' This cultural
disconnect made post-independence constitutions seem contrived
and distant from the everyday lives of most people."Moreover, having
had no input in adopting these instruments, they were seen largely as
irrelevant by the general populaces"
The Africans who helped draft these constitutions were them-
selves cultural subjects who half-heartedly accepted "the values of
democracy, free elections, multi-party politics and capitalism... with-
out understanding the values of their own tribal societies." Elites
generally viewed these legal arrangements as pragmatic compromises
agreed upon to hasten the transfer of power. - Accordingly, after in-
dependence, constitutions and the complex structures they con-
tained were discarded with impunity as they appeared to be con-
spicuous impediments to an efficient government. In reality, the
"Westminster-style model or the more presidential francophone
counterpart offered few answers to the very real dilemmas of the
time."s3 By focusing on the loci of power, these constitutions "failed
over a long period, as western societies went through several phases of so-
cial and economic development. The successful constitution is one which
obtains legitimization by the popular will. Since western values were never
properly assimilated at the grassroots levels of African society, the various
constitutions that represented these -alues never gained legitimacy.
i at 1305. Professor Nwabueze notes that the ideas underlying most post independence con-
stitutions originated in Roman law and Greek philosophy that had been assimilated throughout
Europe. Postindependence constitutions were not part of indigenous cultures which he be-
lieves have "yielded nothing relevant to the organisation of the central government of a modern
complex society." NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 24. He believes, therefore, that there were no
other sources to draw upon and the task was to legitimize foreign ideas through a process of
popularization. People could be made to identilf with constitutions by being involved in the
process of their making. Id. at 24-25.
'8 SeeNwAwUEzE, supra note 8, at 56-58 (discussing the failed attempt to separate the head of
state and head of government in Nigeria, based on the British tradition of the Monarch as head
of state and the Prime Minister as head of government).
'9 I- at 25.
so I at 24. Professor Nwabueze believes this problem could have been ameliorated by sub-
jecting the contents of the constitution to public discussion. Thus, the body drafting the consti-
tution could invite views from the public in the form of articles, memoranda, and the like. This
body could also travel throughout the country and talk %ith people individually and in groups.
Proposals could be published and submiued to the people at a plebiscite. Theoretically, the
constitution would thereby become the property of the people and would win their confidence
and eventually their respect and loyalty. This process of constitution-making could have been a
maor synmbol in the formation of a new state. It at --5-26.
I Dore, supra note 10, at 1305.
2See CHAAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 47.
SA Id. There is little doubt that the problems faced spanned many arenas and were consider-
able. For example, with respect to education, Tangan)ika, Uganda, and Ken)a had education
systems that were il-adapted to the task of supporting viable states. None possessed fully inte-
grated state-wide educational systems, but rather inherited sub-systems catering separately to
each ethnic group. See J. W. Tyler, Education and National identity, in TRFrDMON .. D
TRANSrTON, supra note 44, at 163-64. Many of the -decolonizers* were thernselhes ill-equipped.
As Professor Davidson notes,
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to resolve the important ideological issue of how to locate people's
expectations and aspirations within its compass. '.. Moreover, because
there was little experience in adapting general rules to the particular
situation of given countries, alternative options were not readily avail-
able to be exploredss
The drive to adopt centralized governing frameworks was framed
in the rhetoric of development. Fragmented power structures
made central planning, financial coordination and the formulation
of policies on important matters such as health, education and wel-
fare more difficult.8 7 Hence, concentrating power in one person or
in a bureaucracy could easily be rationalized as a more direct way to
achieve rapid development and advance the general public welfare.ss
This utilitarian argument justified the quest for control by "suggest-
ing that curtailing personal liberties was a necessary sacrifice to fulfill
broader notions of the public good." 9 African rulers could also claim
an administrative apparatus pledged to "nation building," and to the in-
struction of Africans on "how to do it," should have been content with its
political incompetence. Yet those in control of the "transfers of power"
were in practice precisely those least able to measure the dangers ahead,
and to advocate alternatives that might avoid such dangers or diminish
them.... [Plolitical incompetence on the European side has as much a
part in the story of decolonization as anything that can be attributed to the
African side.
DAVIDSON, THE BLACKMAN'S BURDEN, supra note 56, at 174. Developing a national identity also
proved to be elusive. Among the masses of rural and urban supporters of anti-colonial move-
ments, there was little indication of developing loyalties or attachment to the colonies that were
emerging as nations. See CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 47-51.
Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 72.
85 CHAZAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 47.
86 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 72.
87 Elites also argued that the constitutional order frustrated the goals of equity and the de-
livery of services. Id. See also NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 6. Some priorities were almost univer-
sal. For example, improving roads, railways, deepwater ports, and building dams to produce
electricity were deemed essential to expanding the production of wealth. In this realm, real
progress was made. See DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA, supra note 50, at 233. Yet Africa's initiative
to modernize its infrastructure, and to build new economies of wealth, was complex and con-
tradictory. See id. at 234.
88 CHAZAN Er AL, supra note 50, at 47. See also Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law and the Political
Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 MD.J. INT'LL. & TRADE 1, at n.52 and accom-
panying text (1997). "Invoking the motif of centralized planning of the national economy, Af-
rican governments deluded themselves with the illusion that the central government could ef-
fectively manipulate the economy to yield specified results during identified periods of time."
Id. See also NWABUEZE, supra note 8, at 6.
89 CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 47. The search for appropriate regimes in Africa must be
understood within the context of the deterioration in the state-society relationship since inde-
pendence. "For a time, it appeared that the independence bargain between the colonial
authorities and various local interests and the resulting pact among a number of those elites
would nurture progress toward constitutional governments." Donald Rothchild, Strncturing
State-Society Relations in Africa: Toward an Enabling Political Environment, in ECONOMIC CHANCE,
supra note 3, at 202-03. After independence, new ruling coalitions moved swiftly to expand co-
lonial institutions - such as the executive, civil service, police, and army - that were viewed by
elites as avenues to enhance their managerial capacity. Institutions that were regarded as con-
straints on the power to control society - such as multiparty elections, legislative autonomy,
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that discarding foreign pluralist institutions advanced the process of
Africanization,' thus resulting in governing frameworks that were
more faithful to traditional values.
9'
In reality, economic exploitation of the masses continued un-
abated, and the burgeoning bureaucracy facilitated that quest " Most
countries had not developed a strong independent middle class dur-
ing the colonial period, and the postcolonial state was seen by emerg-
ing elites as an avenue for the attainment of wealth and status." In
the absence of a strong private sphere for the accumulation of capi-
tal, this conclusion was not totally inaccurate, although it has led to
disastrous consequences." Having witnessed the departing colonial
elite's conversion of the national economy into a private estate, any
notion of a withering away of state power was viewed by African elites
as undermining their prerogatives.' In the final analysis, independ-
judicial independence, legal protections, constitutional checks on governmental arbitrariness.
and federalism - were restricted or eliminated. "'The result was an enormous expansion in
central government functions and power at the very time that the political elites were showing a
strong preference for state-led economic growth and development." Jd at 203.
CHATZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 47.
91 Dore, supra note 10, at 1306. This was often referred to as African socialism. %%ithin a one
party state framework. The mass party as to be the driving force for not only building nation-
alism and nationalist pride, but also for fostering economic development. The single party was
usually presented as the sole legitimate, democratic mechanism capable of uniting the country
and transcending ethnic and regional loyalties. Id.
Economic exploitation of the African people intensified - at the hands of
the same elites and nationalists who denounced the colonial powers for
exploiting Africa to develop European countries. Resources were ex-
tracted from the rural areas through various legislative devices and controls
for development in imitation of the Soviet Model.
Ayrrr, supra note 44, at 418. Too many of Africa's post-colonial leaders were afflicted uith
intellectual astigmatism and displayed a singular lack of cognitive pragmatism and a generally
dysfunctional perspicacity of the process of development. They spoke of expanding external
trade, but not internal trade; external causes of their economic crises, but not internal causes; at-
tractingforign investment, but not domestic investment; colonial plunder and exploitation, but
not their own Swiss bank accounts.
Id. at 419-20 (emphasis in original).
93 CHAZAN Er AL, supra note 50, at 47. See also Susan Demske, Trade Lie'raleiatan: De Facto
Neocolonialism In West Africa, 86 GEO. LJ. 155, 161-62 (1997). In many cases in Africa. 'central-
ized state bureaucracies became infected with corruption. African elites, concerned about
maintaining some economic stability, played a significant role in the system's continuation." Id.
at 162. See also Arthur E. Anthony, Beyond the Paper 7Tg-e The Challenge of a Hutran Rights Court in
Africa, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 511, 524 (1997) (noting that after independence, African elites con-
tinued to consolidate state power and resist international interference); Abdullah A. An-Na'im.
The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of E&prasion in Afriean and Islaric
Contexts, 11 EiORY INT'L L REV. 29, 55 (1997) (noting that colonialism and its aftermath bur-
dened these nations with structural obstacles that impeded the progress of constitutionalism
and democracy, but that this was no justification for oppression and violation of rights by tie
ruling elites).
CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 47.
95 VWhen Africa was colonized, the colonialists sought to control indigenous
economic activities to their advantage. Africa's colonial history is replete
with successes and failures of these policies.... For the most part. the na-
tives were free to go about their economic activities although there were
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ence constitutions operated as mechanisms to entrench interests that
had accumulated as a result of the exploitative nature of the colonial
96
process.
Ethnic identification also had a profound impact on the resulting
postcolonial political framework. During the colonial era, ethnic
identities were bolstered and then manipulated as part of a divide
97and rule strategy. Religious, regional, and ethnic identities were re-configured; 8 ethnic tensions were exacerbated;9 ethnic groups were
some restrictions on their movements and places of residence in some
colonies.
Ayr=, supra note 44, at 432.
[T]he turning point came after independence. Support services and infra-
structure were not provided. Rather, the economic freedom of the peas-
ants was wrenched from them by 'Swiss bank socialists,' while their eco-
nomic prosperity was taxed and squandered by vampire elites through a
series of edicts, state controls, and decrees.... In many other African
countries, the natives were squeezed out of industry, trade and commerce
where the state emerged as the only, if not the domineering, player....
Other African governments also adopted price controls and various legisla-
tive instruments for the systematic exploitation of the peasants. Prices of
agricultural produce were fixed to render food cheap for the elites - the
basis of political support for African governments. The prices peasants re-
ceived for their produce were dictated by governments, not determined by
market forces in accordance with African traditions.... [U]nder an op-
pressive system of price controls administered by the elites, Africa's peas-
ants came to pay the world's most confiscatory taxes.
Id. at 434-5.
See Demske, supra note 93, at 158-62 (discussing the extent to which the demise of the
formal colonial system involved an apparent relinquishment of political control but assured
continued imperial control over colonial economies). "Political independence did not dra-
matically change the economic landscape.... Once Europeans recognized the inevitability of
political independence, however, they realized they could assure 'continuing effective control'
over the colonies through economic domination." Id. at 159 (internal citations omitted). Indi-
rect exploitation was achieved by encouraging the unequal trade relations that had taken root
during the colonial era. See id.
Even today, with overwhelming empirical evidence of the failure of the
post-colonial state, African elites insist on clinging to this fiction of Euro-
pean creation to the bitter end .... There are several reasons for this re-
sistence to an imagination of political life without the post-colonial state.
The simple explanation is that alienated elites (who have more in common
with, and harbor aspirations of, elites in industrialized countries than with
their teeming masses of rural and urban poor) are loath to give up the
privileges which come from control of the state. Since their lavish lifestyles
stem from the state as organized, it would be suicidal for the leaders to par-
ticipate in changing it. Even when the state is not effective (or on the brink
of collapse) elites will still defend it.
Mutua, supra note 10, at 1119.
97 Before the advent of colonialism, most Africans moved in and out of multiple identities,
defining themselves at one moment as part of this clan, and at another moment as an initiate in
that professional guild. Rather than possessing a single tribal identity, these overlapping net-
works of association and exchange were the norm and extended over wide arenas. Terence
Ranger, The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 211, 248
(Eric Hobsawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
98 Julius 0. Ihonvbere, The "Irrelevant"State, Ethnicity, and the Quest for Nationhood in Africa, 17
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 42, 52 (1994). Professor Ihonvbere points out that prior to the
[Vol. 1: 3
GROWING CONSTITUTIONS
incited to challenge each other; and nascent political leaders were
given ethnic labels and regarded as ethnic leadersY In the final
stages of colonialism, colonial governments attempted to create a
highly-fractionalized political culture that institutionalized conflict
and strengthened centrifugal forces.'0 ' Political parties then "entered
the constitutional process as purveyors of irredentist ideologies,"' "
and ethnic identification permitted elites to acquire and retain
"spheres of interest while advancing their personal, class and occa-
sionally, community interests."' ' In effect, "ethnicity [became] a
mask for class privileges," and this divisive rivalry %%as termed "tribal-
ism."'04 While in the colonial context factionalism wras an aspect of
divide and rule, "in the postcolonial state it enhanced the power of
the bureaucracy."0 5 "In the rough-and-tumble scramble for scarce
land and jobs, group identity became a rallying cry against competing
'others'...."'06
advent of colonialism, ethnic groups in Africa fought violently between and within themselves,
traded, intermarried, and co-existed peacefully.
Dore, supra note 10, at 1303. Some ethnic groups were favored at the expense of others.
For example, some were barred completely from holding particular public positions, enjo)ing
certain facilities, and cultivating specific crops. See Ezetah, supra note 65. at 838. The Tutsis'
political domination of the Hutus in Rwanda arose from such ethnic group favoritism. See rd. at
838. In 1950, the Belgians installed the Tutsis as leaders "on the pretext that tde were the
natural de facto rulers under the indirect rule system." Id. The Tutsis, thereby received 83% of
all available political and economic positions. See ihL Arguably. Tutsis' dornination of tie Hutus
in Rwanda and Burundi and the resulting civil u-m' are a result of Belgian colonization and in-
direct rule. See id (citing Hector Gros-Espiell, THE RIGHT TO SEI.FDETER0INLTION.
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNIED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 11 (1980)).
1 Ihonvbere, supra note 98, at 52. "When these new leaders formed ethnic-based political
parties in the 1940s and 1950s, the colonial powers gladly recognized them, since ethnic-based
political organization and competition weakened the nationalists and compromised the strug-
gle for political freedom." Id.
101 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 10. These antagonisms tended to be "organized around
ancient claims, accrued rights, future demands, or matters that were particularly sensitive to
race, religion, economy or even geography." Id.
02 Id. at 69.
103 Ihonvbere, supra note 98, at 54.
104 Id. (quoting OttwuDmA NNOu, ETHNIC POLITIcS IN NIGERA 10 (1978)). Tribalism has
been defined as the reinforcement of kinship or other local alliances that compete against
other such alliances. See, eg., Ezetah, supra note 65, at 813 (comparing die link between the ex-
ploitation and neglect of the Ogoni people in Nigeria to "the ethno-cultural fragmentation of
the Nigerian political body, sometimes crudely described as 'tribalism"). The Ogoni are one of
the many ethnic groups in Nigeria that have zealously preserved their traditional political struc-
tures despite the incursions of Western society. Id. at 814. Ogoniland is rich in natural re-
sources, and the exploitation of Ogoniland continued long after independence wtth the Ogoni
people reaping little, if any, benefit from their government's sale of their resources. Ulien they
sought to make the government more accountable, the response WAs scorn, contempt, and vio-
lence. The government blamed this violence on tribal rivalry and these divisive tactics polarized
the ethnic groups of Ogoniland. Id. at 821.
105 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 69. The civil service in many countries began to make
policy. Because the civil service was completely controlled by the executive branch of govern-
ment, there was no concept of objective disciplinary control. See id.
16 ANNE SEIDMAN & ROBERT B. SEIDMAN, STATE AND LAW IN THE DIVELOPME\ r PROCESS:
PROBLEIM-SOLVING AND INSTTrIONAL CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD 152 (1994).
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The policy of impedance focused "directly... on the fragile and
fluid political organs constructed at independence."' 7 A range of
policies were utilized to consolidate single-party dominance and to
centralize power. Postcolonial institutions, such as political parties,
that "perpetuat[ed] formalized rivalr[ies] with the ruling coalition
were reshaped or eradicated, whereas those that enhanced the cen-
tral leadership were sustained and elaborated."' 8 The ruling party
circumscribed and limited opportunities to oppose its authority, and
dismantled constitutional protections designed to protect opposi-
tion.1°9 New leaders denounced regionalism as divisive.1 They emas-
culated "quasi-federal provisions," eliminated "regional political
bases" of power, and placed local governments "under the aegis of
central institutions.""' They also outlawed rival opposition political
groups that were "based on particularistic, sectarian or ethnic inter-
ests." 12 The fusion of opposition and ruling parties was encouraged,
"legal means were employed to make it essentially impossible for op-
position parties to subsist.... [o]pposition leaders were harassed[,]"
and other efforts were made to forcefully stifle opposing voices."' In
other venues, leaders simply assumed that the electorate would not
support weak parties." 4 Membership in the ruling party was required
for political recruitment at all levels (local, municipal and parliamen-
tary), thereby fostering the transition to the one party state."' With
alternative power bases officially crippled, "opposition parties were
on tenuous ground when they sought to mobilize support or criticize
government actions.""6
These methods of thwarting the opposition had a profound im-
pact on participatory and representative institutions. National as-
semblies and parliaments, packed with supporters of the ruling party,
increasingly became decree-sanctioning bodies instead of legisla-
tures. 1 7 Parliamentary debates degenerated into opportunities to ex-
press support or to bargain; "[t] hey rarely permitted real engagement
in policy formulation or even constructive commentary on the direc-
tion of government policies."" 8 A rising bureaucracy and the person-
alization of power accompanied the demise of formal pluralistic insti-
107 See CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 50.
108 Id. at 47.
109 See id. at 47-48.
III Id-
112 Id. at 48. Some new leaders believed they could reduce opposition by outlawing rival po-
litical organizations. Ghana and Guinea, for example, "paved the way for such actions by de-
claring local political parties illegal and contrary to national interests." Id.
11 Id. at 49. Different methods were used in different countries. See id.
114 Id.
115 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 75-76.
16 CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 48.
117 See id at 50.
118 Id. at 50.
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tutions. The end result was a strong emphasis on the state and bu-
reaucratic structures. This bureaucracy was largely a holdover from
the colonial order that was at the base of an often coercive adminis-
trative system, and it concentrated and entrenched power in non-
accountable hands.
C. The Colonial Administrative Legacy
The institutional basis of the postcolonial state was the colonial
state, because the institutions created upon decolonization were
adapted into the only legacy that appeared to be available: a colonial
legacy. 9 Yet this legacy 'was invariably authoritarian, centralist, bu-
reaucratic and concerned above all else with top-doxn forms of gov-120
ernance. As decolonization proceeded, colonial paradigms were
often elaborated upon rather than transformed, and thus political
independence did not substantially change many of the basic features
of the African state.121 While administrative functions were "African-
ized" when feasible,In the fundamental organization of the State in
9 Id. at 42.
120 BASIL DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FORAFRiCK HISTORY, CULTLURE, POLmCS 249 (1994) [here-
inafter DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FORAFRICA]. The formal agencies that were actually transferred
to the Africans upon decolonization were "alien in derivation, functionally conceived, bureau-
cratically designed, authoritarian in nature, and primarily concerned %isth issues of domination
rather than legitimacy." CHAzA ETAL, supra note 50, at 43. Given their objectives and mission
during the colonial era, this is hardly surprising.
See Chibundu, supra note 5, at 248.49. Like their Western counterparts, the African elite
viewed law as instrumental for development. See id. at 241-42. "What the 'nation builders' of
the British Colonial Office understood as a duty was the need to ensure 'continuity'" as Africa
moved towards self-government. DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN, supra note 56, at 178.
They assumed that they understood the needs of any future African state better than the Afri-
cans, and that the reconfigured British empire would still make substantial contributions to the
motherland. The first assumption fed the second, and constitutional reform in the colonies
made colonial rule more effective, in some respects, instead of hastening its demise. Rather
than creating the conditions for Africans to participate directly in government, British colonial
service recruitment increased by more than fifty-nine percent between 1947 and 1957. Until
the eve of decolonization, "the prospect of independence for each and every territory was quite
remote." Id.
' SeeSEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 106, at 32.
At various phases in the evolution of the colonial period, there emerged in
the colonial countries at different times, an educated elite. This elite de-
manded changes within the colonial administration and, eventually, an
end to colonization itself.... The goal was, somewhat paradoxically, to
emulate the life style and institutions of the metropolitan power, and to
demand parity with its citizens. This translated into the creation of gov-
ernmental structures and legal systems for Africa that were rather sinilar to
those which existed in the colonizing power itself.
Dore, supra note 10, at 1304. While the elite shared the desire for modernizing *law and legal
institutions such as the administrative and judicial machinery of the state... they also articu-
lated two other fundamental purposes for law: Its unification and its Africanization.- Chi-
bundu, supra note 5, at 183. The elite expressed a desire to integrate traditional, local, or cus-
tommy practices with the law left behind by the colonial rulers. "This reflected a belief that the
result would be the emergence of African Law, law that in its benign incarnation would reflect
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independent Africa was to a great extent a structural continuation
from the colonial period .
The method and institutions of governance imposed by colonial
rule were generally unknown prior to colonization.2 4  Accordingly,
the colonial state lacked a foundation in the experiences and con-
cerns of the indigenous peoples over whom it governed. These in-
stitutions were then superimposed on traditional African institutions
which had been changed, but not necessarily destroyed."1 While
some nationalists may have understood the political and moral impli-
the experiences and aspirations of African societies and the African people." Id.
123 Mahmood Mamdani, The Social Basis of Constitutionalism in Africa, 28 J. MOD. AFR. STUD.
359, 364. The postcolonial state took as its norm the administrative and economic structures
configured during the colonial experience. Chibundu, supra note 5, at 251. Professor Mutua
notes:
Hansen has identified the crisis of the African state in its failure to trans-
form the colonial state. He argues that though formally independent, Af-
rican states are still conceptually colonial entities, heavily reliant on the
structures of the colonial state. There is little doubt that the only signifi-
cant changes at the independence was not the restructuring of the state
but the changing of the guard, the replacement of white by black faces in
the state house. It fell on the new rulers to bring legitimacy to the colonial
state, now labeled the post-colonial, black ruled state.
Mutua, supra note 10, at 1145 (citations omitted). Professor Young posits that
the assimilation by the late colonial state of a welfare ideology as [a] doc-
trine of legitimation, and the nature of its developmentalism produced a
curious syndrome of citizen attitudes and expectations. Welfare, in the
terminal colonial era, was bestowed from above in the characteristically pa-
ternalist mode: borrowing a John Ayoade expression, and mixing gender
metaphors, the colonial polity became a "Mother Theresa" state. But at
the same time the state remained external to the citizen, an alien and
predatory other .... The inheritors of the postcolonial state [tried] to
outbid their colonial predecessors by exaggerating the benevolence of the
state... encouraged the growth of public spending by emphasizing the
benefits, rather than the costs, of the welfare state as if benefits are costless.
YOUNG, supra note 47, at 279-80 (internal quotations omitted).
124 Chibundu, supra note 5, at 247.
125 See id The seeds for the ensuing crisis of legitimacy were sown during the colonial period
when colonial administrative units were created in an arbitrary fashion and, therefore, lacked
the social solidarity or consensus necessary to engender a sense of nationhood. They were sub-
sequently incapable of functioning as states after independence. This lack of a common socio-
political identity was accompanied by the belief at the grassroots level that the institutions cre-
ated by the new constitutions were unlikely to fosterjustice in their communities.
"Having been designed abroad, there was a fundamental mismatch between the values of
the people of Africa and the western values which inspired the drafters of the new constitu-
tions." Dore, supra note 10, at 1304-05.
Unlike their European counterparts, African states and borders are dis-
tinctly artificial and are not "the visible expression of the age-long efforts of
[indigenous] peoples to achieve political adjustment between themselves
and the physical conditions in which they live." Colonization interrupted
that historical and evolutionary process. Since then Africa has attempted,
often unsuccessfully, to live up to and within these new formulations; all
too frequently the consequences have been disastrous.
Mutua, supra note 10, at 1115 (citations omitted).
126 Dore, supra note 10, at 1303.
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cations of the colonial legacies they were inheriting,'"' many nonethe-
less joined in building a new oligarchy of power and privilege."' s Few
thought traditional institutions were at all relevant in building a
modem state.12
1. The Colonial Governing Apparatus
The colonial order was inherently undemocratic and was con-
cerned primarily with authority and domination. Political and ad-
ministrative functions were concentrated in the hands of the colonial
civil service; hence, governing structures did not separate the roles of
decision making and decision implementation." Control and coer-
127 DAVIDSON, THE BLAcK MAN'S BURDEN, supra note 56, at 181-82. An informed assessment
of future prospects for these emerging entities may have been difficult because of a lack of in-
formation from their colonizers. Moreover, there may have been dearth of analysis and long-
term thinldng on the part of nationalists. I&L
1 SEiDmAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 106, at 152.
1 Dore, supra note 10, at 1304-05. A leading Nigerian economist and reformer. Adebayo
Adedeji, has postulated that
[s]o great and pervasive has been the doxwn-thrusting of colonial rule that
many Africans and most non-Africans have persistently denigrated the pre-
colonial historical achievements of the continent - its arts, customs, be-
liefs, system of government and the art of governance. Indeed, the tragedy
has been that when the opportunity came to cast aside the yoke of colonial-
ism, no effort was made to reassert Africa's self-determination by replacing
the inherited foreign institutions and system of government, and the
flawed European models of nation-states, with rejuvenated and modernised
indigenous African systems that the people would easily relate to and
would therefore be credible .... There can be no doubt that Africa needs
a new political order which breaks the umbilical cord from its unen'iable
colonial inheritance.
DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FORAFRICA, supra note 120, at 251.
122 CHA7AN Er AL, supra note 50, at 42. "The colonial state was sharply divided between
colonisers and colonised and... between rural and urban areas." Mfamdani. supra note 123, at
364. In cities and towns, European populations were the subjects of liberal bourgeois states
that had dear demarcations between the administrative, judicial, legislative and executive
branches of government. In the absence of white settlers, this liberal colonial regime ums
gradually extended to immigrant minorities and finally, in the later stages of colonialism, to the
indigenous middle classes. Id. "Autocratic centralism" characterized the colonial state, with all
real power of policy and decision making embodied in a supreme governor appointed in a re-
mote foreign capital and operating at a distance. DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FOR AFRICa% supra
note 120, at 248-49. "From this autocracy, in colonial times, there had derived a more or less
total alienation of governors from governed, intellectually and morally, and in all customary
attachments of everyday life." Id. at 249.
With the African subject thus firmly constructed in the official conscious-
ness of the colonial ruler as a savage child, systematic exclusion was the es-
sence of statecraft. In those intermediary roles where African participation
was necessary - above all, the apparatus of native administration - firm
tutelage was indispensable. Even in areas where doctrines of scientific co-
lonial management appeared to vest the greatest degree of responsibility in
the African rulers recognized as anointed intermediaries - the British ter-
ritories where indirect-rule ideology was most thoroughly applied - the
inner spirit of administration was pervasively autocratic, and chiefs were
viewed foremost as stewards of British rule.
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cion were at the center of the colonial legal order,' and this pattern
of organization was reinforced by a well-developed coercive estab-
lishment.3 3 Despotism was decentralized, however, and the daily vio-
lence of the colonial system was often carried out by native authori-
ties in the local state rather than by the civil power at the center.'"3
Appointed indigenous rulers were sustained and supported by colo-
nial administrations.'" Consequently, even as indigenous institutions
were retained and redefined, colonial rule superimposed a new ad-
ministrative edifice on these social and political orders." Local lead-
ers exercised expansive powers over indigenous populations that
generally translated into boundless discretion.' 36
In rural areas, colonialism ushered in command by elders over
land allocation, marriage transactions and political office.3 7 There
were forced crops, sales, contributions, land enclosures and forced
labor;'-" in effect, it was a system designed to regularly and systemati-
YOUNG, supra note 47, at 224 (internal quotes omitted).
131 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 69.
132 CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 42.
133 A basic territorial grid of regional administration, staffed by Europeans,
was indispensable. This required a coercive underpinning from a military
force directly controlled by the colonial state; however, only a small cadre
of European officers was needed, to train, discipline, and command forces
whose basic ranks were filled with locally recruited (or conscripted) sol-
diers. Effective occupation could only be mediated through an array of
collaborating indigenous intermediaries.
YOUNG, supra note 47, at 76. "[B]elow the bottom echelon of European regional administration
an array of African chiefs were recognized, and vested with the authority of the colonial state, in
addition to whatever title they enjoyed on their own. Furthermore, the colonial state insisted
that those chiefs it recognized were the sole authority holders within the reconfigured political
space subject to its design." Id at 107.
S t CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 50, at 43.
135 Id at 42-43. "The political cultures and state ideologies of the colonizing polities were not
identical. They produced somewhat different underlying perspectives concerning the value of
African institutions, even if in the early phases all were equally compelled by the stringent cir-
cumstances of constructing hegemony to seek, where available, the collaboration of indigenous
rulers." YOUNG, supra note 47, at 107-08.
13 SEIDMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 106, at 159. The power possessed by indigenous elites was
non-existent vis a vis colonial personnel, who held absolute power over all local leaders. While
ultimate power resided in colonial administrators, local "power" was exercised by chiefs.
137 Chiefs "enumerated the property of their subjects, assessed and collected their taxes,
heard the appeals of those who felt they had been unfairly assessed, and arrested / jailed those
who failed to pay their taxes." Mamdani, supra note 123, at 365. "The chiefs were generally
given a commission on the taxes collected, which doubtless often exceeded state demands."
YOUNG, supra note 47, at 128. "Material incentives by no means sufficed to ensure vigorous tax
collection by the chiefs. Revocations, imprisonment, and public whippings of chiefs were fre-
quent in the early period for derelict performance in fulfilling tax and labor demands of the
administration. The chiefs were ordered to collect taxes; the means used were up to them, so
long as the revenue was delivered." Id. at 129. In many parts of Africa, this exploitation has
intensified in the postcolonial era. "Under the guise of ideological purification[,] ... (s]tate
authority has been redefined as state-party authority and its ... representative renamed a
cadre' as opposed to a 'chief' .... " Mamdani, supra note 123, at 365.
,S See Mamdani, supra note 123, at 365. All of the colonial powers employed forced labor in
one form or another although, after the 1920's, many utilized indirect means such as imposing
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cally exploit the peasantry.' s9 While this paradigm was partly rational-
ized as a continuation of "traditional" precolonial governance, an ex-
amination of clan and administrative authority in most precolonial
systems reveals that this claim is erroneous.'o Rather, there was a
poll taxes that had to be paid in cash. SeeDAVIDSON. THE SEARCH FORAFICA, supra note 120. at
187. Cash could be earned by working for whites. Direct forms of forced labor diminished ex-
cept in Portuguese colonies. There slavery, which was formally abolished before 1900, gave way
to the use of forced labor by means of a "contractual" system, where Africans were deemed to
be working only when they worked for wages, and thus, they worked overwhelmingly for whites.
In Angola, employers who needed forced labor had only to apply to the governor-general who
allocated contradados according to a theoretical calculation of the probable number of adult
males available. Id. Approved demands for forced labor were then sent to local administrators
and the chefe de posto. Id. at 138.
13 Colonial rule destroyed old, and often prosperous, regional networks of trade and im-
posed quite different ones. "[C]olonial networks were designed, primarily, to make African
labour and land serve the interests and profit of the colon)owning powers." DANIMSO.,
MODERN AFRICA, supra note 50, at 198. The colonial governments used force to achieve this
objective, and they also employed divide-and-rule policies that have been termed 'colonial tri-
baism' by Professor Davidson. African agriculture was directed into export-crop production,
which simultaneously assured income for head-tax payment and export taxes. See id. at 220.
Thus, the colonial state developed agricultural services to promote and if
need be enforce cultivation of crops with an external market .... Local
administrators drew up an 'agricultural program' for their territory, con-
sisting of minimum surface areas for cash and some food crops. Failure to
exhibit such cultivated acreage on the visit of the agronomist was prima fa-
cie evidence of contravention of the obligatory cultivation ordinance and
exposed the offender to fines, beatings, or prison. Local administrators...
were informed.., that the 1917 ordinance equipped them with 'the means
necessary to induce cultivators to expand their crops.' These means...
.were nothing other than, military or police occupation.' The dominant
view was: 'The sole way to improve native agriculture is to force the blacks
to place their crops following the principals indicated by competent
agents.' At this time, only the territorial administration, backed by armed
force, can achieve this goal, and even this only temporarily.
It.
40 Ranger, supra note 97, at 247. Relying on "tradition" tojustify this system 1was to rely on a
"tradition" that was largely created by Europeans. The most far reaching inventions of tradition
took place when Europeans believed they were respecting tradition. Customary law, land rights,
political structures and other precepts were formulated in colonial codifications; these "tradi-
tions" invariably favored elders, and men. Africans manipulated this invented custom and par-
ticipated in creating it. "[T]he boundaries of the 'tribal' polity and the hierarchies of authority
within them did not define conceptual horizons of [most] Africans" to the extent pressed by
Europeans. Id. at 248.
[N]ineteenth century Africa was not characterized by lack of internal social
and economic competition, by the unchallenged authority of the elders, by
an acceptance of custom which gave every person - young and old, male
and female - a place in society which was defined and protected. Competi-
tion, movement, fluidity were as much features of small-scale communities
as they were of larger groupings.
Id. For example, studies have shown that women in select societies constantly found themselves
trying to find new niches for themselves. It was in the twentieth century that the dogmas of cus-
tomary security and immutably fixed relationships developed, and societies appeared to possess
an ujamma-style solidarity. See iUt at 248-49. ("Ujamma" is a Swvahili word meaning togetherness
or neighbourliness). In 1967, the Tanzanian government used the policy of ujamma to bring
the interests of village people into line with the interests of townspeople, and to develop Tanza-
nia without dividing it. Therefore, ujamma villages were created that provided for primary
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conscious determination by colonial authorities to establish order,
security and a sense of community by defining and reinforcing the
European version of "tradition."4
2. Decolonization
The colonial model of domination and coercion was generally
preserved in most independence constitutions and became the foun-
dation of administration in the postcolonial state.4 2  The judicial
branch, which administered this coercive order, was retained and it
saddled new states with a jurisprudence based on force.' 3 Most post-
independence constitutions also retained the colonial legal order as
the residual law of the new state. Administrative institutions were for-
schools, health clinics and farming tools. See Davidson, Modem Africa, supra note 50, at 229-30.
Europeans contended that African society entailed a framework of clearly-defined hierar-
chical statuses, and these hierarchies were utilized to uphold customary law. See Ranger, supra
note 97, at 247. Europeans also maintained that African society was a monolithic and pro-
foundly conservative society where age-old rules did not change and ideology was based on an
absence of change. While precolonial African societies valued custom and continuity, custom
may have been more loosely defined and more flexible than in the African system posed by
Europeans. Custom helped to maintain a sense of identity, but it also allowed for adaptation
that was both spontaneous and natural. The closed corporate consensual system that came to
be accepted as characteristic of traditional Africa was a rarity. Id. at 248.
141 The twentieth century process of immobilizing populations, reinforcing ethnicity and in-
creasing the rigidity in social demarcations was in part unplanned, and may have in part been
an inevitable consequence of colonial economic and political change. It included destroying
internal patterns of trade and communications, defining territorial boundaries, alienating
land, and establishing reserves. Id. at 248.
142 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 67-68, 72.
The imposition of a strong unitary and highly centralized administrative
system of government is most likely to exacerbate ethnic divisions, disunity,
political strife, chronic instability, civil wars and even secession attempts.
Abundant evidence from Africa's own pre-colonial history attest to these
lessons. But tragically, African elites and intellectuals, dismissing the in-
digenous system as "backward" and "archaic," scoffed at these lessons and
erected political and leadership systems which were not only a far cry from
the traditional but also produced interminable chaos since independence
in the 1960's.... [T]his vulgar caricature of leadership is an elite contrap-
tion and was never an integral part of indigenous African political culture.
But unbelievably in modern times, various intellectuals, experts, scholars,
governments, multi-lateral institutions, and aid agencies, both African and
Western, serenaded and supported such grotesque leadership as "authen-
tically African."
AYTEy, supra note 44, at 271-72.
143 See Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 69, 73-74. As accountability by the executive to the
legislature and the masses decreased, it was accompanied by a decline in the role of the judici-
ary. See Dore, supra note 10, at 1307. As executive power became unaccountable, the courts
could not mediate disputes between the executive and legislative branches. In states such as
Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Benin and Togo, the judiciary came to be viewed as a tool to serve the
party and its conception ofjustice. In other states such as Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, the
judiciary had more independence, but was still powerless to limit governmental power or pro-
tect individual rights. Id.
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tiffed, and enforcement agencies such as the army and police grew.' "
Armies and military expenditures increased exponentially, and
paramilitary structures such as presidential guards proliferated.""
The expansion of the coercive branch of government led to the for-
mation of a highly-organized group with distinct professional and
corporate interests,17 and contemporary police forces and the mili-
tary have been the only true challengers to state power in the post-
colonial era.148
Colonial economies were managed economies that were to ex-
propriate and expatriate surplus value from colonies to metropolitan
centers, and these functions were accomplished through the civil
service. Independence expanded the role of the state in economic
matters and it has remained at the center of most economies as an
owner or manager of the means of production, or through such enti-
ties as marketing boards, parastatals and public utilities.""-
3. Facilitation
The institutional readjustment process focused on measures de-
signed to augment the power apparatus." This strategy concentrated
on three critical systems: administration, security and the executive.
At independence, the administrative apparatus was the major reser-
4 SeeCHAZAN, ErAL, supra note 50, at 58-59.
Everyone agrees that colonialism did not bequeath much to Africa by wav
of infrastructure and development facilities. One would have expected a
retention of the "positive" legacies and a discard of the 'negatives.- But...
African elites and nationalists did precisely the opposite. Thc' kept tie
"negatives" (repressive measures, guns, the army, artificial borders) and
destroyed the "positives" (infrastructure, parliament). The army, a colo-
nial institution, wras expanded enormously in post-colonial Africa. African
governments railed at the "artificial colonial borders" and yet retained and
manned them by uniformed bandits.
AvrTrEY, supra note 44, at 411.
145 See CHAZAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 59 (showing statistics for military spending).
146 See i&. at 58.
147 See id.
"8 Chibundu, supra note 5, at 233. Most post-independence constitutional initiatives in A&
rica have been instituted by military regimes. "It is estimated that between January 1956 anti
the end of 1985 there were 60 successful coups, many (or probably most) of these resulting in
some form of new constitution." Eboe Hutchfful, PRwonsmting Political Spae. Ilhtansm and
Constitutionalism in Africa, in CONSTrruTIONA.ISM AND DFtoCRACV, supra note I. at 215. Neath
every African state has experienced an attempted coup and until recently, the armed forces
ruled almost half the states on the continent. Se id. Over a third of sub-S'haran African na-
tions have experienced several military takeovers. Se CtiAZN Et L.U supra note 50. at 7. -The
move from civilian to military rule and back again has become an essential part of the rhythm
of politics in postcolonial Africa." I& at 12-13; see also Mutua, supra note 10, at 1116 n.l 1. 1143
n.126.
149 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 70.
150 Chibundu, supra note 5, at 231. All of these entities existed in the colonial state in sonie
form.
1 See CHAZAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 46.
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voir of skilled personnel and was critical to devising and implement-
ing economic policies and maintaining order. Consequently, leaders
sought to remold these bodies to better promote their interests. 
2
Africanization was the norm, and "[s] ervice ministries such as educa-
tion, health, and community welfare were greatly expanded."' Most
nations also established planning bureaus and state-owned corpora-
tions (parastatals), as the number of administrative bodies multi-
plied.' 54- The chief executive was usually given appointive and dis-
missal authority over all officers in the public service.
"[E]xpansion of the administrative apparatus also proved to be a
crucial means for personal advancement., 56 The facilitation of bu-
reaucratic institutions allowed select individuals to gain direct access
to state resources and to the considerable privileges associated with
'57administrative office. Hence, the requirements of governance
dovetailed quite well with the personal interests of technocrats, the
educated bloc, and party militants. Association with the state com-
plex emerged as the key avenue to social advancement and class dif-
ferentiation. Diminishing political prospects alongside blossoming
administrative and coercive institutions led to the same institutional
imbalance that characterized the colonial period.""s
To reign in a growing bureaucracy that had no clear political af-
finities, governments began to use the party to supervise the bureauc-
racy.59  Party functionaries were lodged in the civil service, police,
army and local government, thereby politicizing these entities.'60
Eventually the boundaries between party and government began to
collapse, and these entities began to overlap in myriad fashions.' In
152 See id. at 46-50.
153 Id. at 50.
154 See i& at 55.
155 Okoth-Ogendo, supra note 1, at 74.
C HAZAN ETAL., supra note 50, at 51.
157 Id. at 49. Efforts at "reform" meant moving local citizens more quickly and effectively into
the existing hierarchical structure or expanding structures laterally to assume new developmen-
tal functions. Id. at 51 (quoting DAVID B. ABERNATHY, BUREACRATIC GROWrH AND ECONOMIC
DECLINE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1983)). That the top civil servants earned at least forty times
more than the per capita gross domestic product of the country was never seriously questioned.
See id.
l5 See id.
15. See id.
160 See id.
161 Id. In Tanzania, for example, political leaders proclaimed the party to be the preeminent
public institution even though the division between the party and the state was not always ap-
parent. The party always had a hand in policy formulation. See id.
The single party state elsewhere in Africa did not tolerate any opposition.
With power moving to the party leader and the executive (as in Malawi,
Kenya and Ghana) lines of accountability of the executive and the party to
the legislature became blurred. The legislature existed in name only, with
both it and the constitution retained as a facade to provide legitimacy to
the ruling elite.
Dore, supra note 10, at 1307.
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some nations the party absorbed state structures, while in others, the
growth of the administrative apparatus had the opposite effect of
subordinating the party to government institutions. !Whatever the
precise pattern of the party-state relationship, there were political
party elements that generally intruded into the decision-enforcing in-
stitutions of government. The party became the channel to the ad-
ministration, thereby "making the administrative apparatus subject to
particularistic political demands."'63 This scenario also muddled the
locus of decision-making, which was not firmly located in administra-
tive units, government decision-makers or the party."'
Finally, the state power apparatus was concentrated in the hands
of individual leaders. "The personalization of decisionmaking wras a
concomitant of the overall trend toward centralization." t" Leader-
ship became a substitute for regularized channels of policymaking,
and consequently even when other agencies were involved, it w%-as the
president who had the final say.'# While presidential decisions were
perhaps influenced by the opinions of others, there were no institu-
tional restraints on this decision-making capacity, nor was it subjected
to "organized pressures from below."' t The paradigm that developed
was a neo-patrimonial state where relationships to a person, rather
than to an office holder, thrived within a purportedly rational legal
administrative system. The state was characterized by a political plu-
ralism that was limited to minuscule enclaves, a "strong emphasis on
statism and bureaucratic structures," politicized administrative insti-
tutions and "personalistic forms of decisionmalang."'s Although it
was monopolistic, however, the postcolonial state's power and legiti-
macy were tenuous and its authority limited; while centralization be-
came a means of consolidation, it did not necessarily mean full con-
trol.'
The shift toward statism made politics an important means to ma-
terial advancement and a "key criterion for social differentiation."
:'
The growth of the bureaucracy engendered additional ?rofound ine-
qualities and "new lines of social cleavage and tension." "The diffi-
culties that accompanied Africanization and the spread of the bu-
reaucratic apparatus were compounded by the tendency of
1 2 See CHAZAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 51-52 (detailing state absorption into te party in Mo-
zambique and Angola, and the opposite trend in Cote D'Ivoire and Kenya).
63 Id at52.
164 Id.
1 Id at 53.
166 Id.
16 Id. Party officials, personal advisors, technical experts, senior bureaucrats and specific
local and perhaps foreign interests may have weighed in, but there were few if any institutional
restraints on the exercise of power. Id.
162 IM.
169Se 
i
1.0 Id. at 55.
171 Id.
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governments to strengthen existing public corporations inherited
from the colonial period, 72 and to establish state enterprises of their
own (parastatals).,,1 The weakness of indigenous enterprises and the
paucity of domestic capital led many leaders to set up their own cor-
porations to deal with particular undertakings in the areas of produc-
tion and distribution.1
Thus, Africa emerged from colonialism with states that were not
nations, and with foreign democratic systems that were not rooted in
African cultures. Elites only half-heartedly accepted the democratic
structures that overlay a legal and administrative apparatus that was
the antithesis of democracy. Government largess and foreign aid be-
came sources of wealth in poor nations where there were few other
means to amass funds. This confluence of difficult conditions re-
sulted in constitutional irrelevance, coup d'etats, and the general
failure of many postcolonial states. While it is not certain that modes
of governance within local frameworks would have avoided these
problems altogether, it surely would have alleviated them and proba-
bly would have resulted in wider participation and accountability.
The story of Somalia is unique, yet typical, and fits within the para-
digm examined thus far.
III. SOMALIA
A. Pre-Colonial Somalia
Most Somalis are nomadic herdsmen who have grazed camels,
sheep, goats and cattle over the plains of the Horn of Africa for cen-
turies." Before European colonization in the late nineteenth cen-
-1 Colonial governments had created some such organizations, most notably utility compa-
nies and export commodity marketing boards. At independence, these institutions were trans-
ferred as part of the colonial legacy. See id at 56 (discussing expansion of administrative control
in African institutions).
173 Id. at 55.
174 See id. at 53. The growth of parastatals in the post-independence era was phenomenal.
Some dealt specifically with the extraction and sale of agricultural products, while others dealt
with industry and manufacturing. See id.
175 SeeLewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 101. Much of Somalia is semi-arid and suited for little
beyond livestock production. Thus far, pastoralism has proven to be the most efficient means
to exploit semi-arid climates; experts project that Somali livestock production can only be im-
proved by, at most, ten percent. See ANNA SIMONS, NEIvORS OF DISSOLUTION: SOMALIA
UNDONE 29 (1995). See aLsoJarat Chopra, Achilles-Heel in Somalia: Learning from a Conceptual Fail-
ure, 31 TEX. INTWL L.J. 495, 504 (1996) (noting that the semi-arid climate of Somalia necessi-
tates a pastoral way of life for most Somalians). Conflicts within this context were more likely to
be over access to pasture land and water, rather than for the myriad reasons that later
prompted the civil war. See Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 104. Agricultural production is
largely limited to the relatively fertile region of the Shebelle and Juba Rivers in Southern Soma-
lia, where Italian colonizers established banana and sugar plantations. The Southern region,
and its population, has long been over-exploited. See SIMONS, supra. Some Somalis migrated to
coastal towns where they co-existed with Persian, Arab and Swahili traders, acting as middle-
men, guides, interpreters and protectors, and as trade links to the interior. See id. at 33.
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tury, the Somali people were not organized into a state despite a
strong sense of linguistic, religious and cultural identity.'7 Rather, a
decentralized political system comprising an elaborate succession of
clans and sub-clans governed political life.'" Within this political sys-
tern, "political identity and loyalty [were] determined by genealogical
closeness and remoteness."" 8 Lacking a centralized government,
Somali politics were a way of securing diverse kinship loyalties be-
tween clans." 9
Genealogy is at the center of the Somali social system,' and the
"ideology of kinship had two central elements: blood-ties and heer.""'
Blood-ties were based on "genealogical connections reinforced by a
patrilineal system rooted in a real or invented common origin or an-
cestor." "i Heerwas comprised of an unwr-itten but widely adhered to
code of conduct which "emphasized the values of interdependence
and inclusiveness and thus formed the basis for social order."'" This
society, structured without a governing head, was both egalitarian
and democratic, but susceptible to internecine feuds." Production,
which was small in scale and coterminous with consumption, took
place within the household. Political norms and cultural values were
176 See Chopra, supra note 175, at 503-04. Pastoral herders developed an ideal of nomadic
independence, despising agricultural cultivation, government, authority, and hierarchy. See id.
(discussing pre-colonial Somalia). Despite this nomadic ideal, "Somalis share a common lan-
guage (Somaale), religion (Islam), physical characteristics, and pastoral... customs and tradi-
tions." SeeAdam, supra note 4, at 70. Somalis converted to Islam after long contact with Per-
sian and Arab immigrants who had established a series of coastal setflemenism The large-scale
conversion of Somalis to Islam took place from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. So.tId.
A COuNTRYSTUDY5-6 (Helen Chapin Metz, ed. 1993).
17 SeeLevwis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 101. The Somali populace consists of six major clan
families: Hawiye, Daarod, Isaaq, Dir, Rahanwayn, and Digil. &e SOx!L'L A COL'N.T ST'Dy.
supra note 176, at 71. The first four families are ovenihelmingly pastoral nomads, while the last
two are primarily farmers. Se id. Each major dan family is subdivided into at least six clans,
and each dan is further divided and subdivided all the w-ay downm to the ir, "or household. See
Adam, supra note 4, at 69; LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 8. "T1he clan structure was fur-
ther reinforced by communal access to the range and family ownership of the herd, the princi-
pal economic asset." i. at 8-10. There has been a serious debate about the origins of Somali
clans and clan families, but, despite this uncertainty, migration seems to have been a major fac-
tor in inter-clan and inter-family politics. See SIMoNS, supra note 175, at 32. "The number and
size of clans within a dan-family varied; the average dan in the twentieth century numbered
about 100,000 people. Clans controlled a given territory, essentially defined by the circuit of
nomadic migration but having unspecified boundaries, so that the territories of neighboring
clans tended to overlap." SOMAIA: A COUNTRYSTUDY, supra note 176, at 74-75.
1 See Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 101. Political anthropologists have classified this Sy-
tem as a "segmentary lineage system." Id.
179 See id at 102.
ISOMALIA: A COUmNRYSTUDY, supra note 176, at 71.
1 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 8.
182 Id The common ancestor is Samaale, to whom a great majority of Somalis trace their ge-
nealogical roots. SeeSoMALTA: A COUNRYSTUDY, supra note 176, at71.
183 See LYONS & SAMIATAR, supra note 36, at 10. While this code of conduct did not eliminate
conflict, it did offer a workable way of handling such discord. "The combined meaning of these
elements constituted the milieu in which the private and the public -ere defined." Id.
18 See id.
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linked to economic structures through the ideology of kinship, which
created "an interlinked web of social, economic and political institu-
tions."'8 Somalis possess a powerful sense of ethnic exclusiveness,
notwithstanding their myriad internal divisions, and their contact
with the outside world has frequently been confrontational. 8 ' Need-
less to say, they resisted colonialism.'
B. Colonial Somalia
1. Colonial Rule
Four states colonized Somolia, and divided the land into five terri-
tories. 'm Colonization began after the British occupied the port of
Aden in Yemen in 1839-1840, in order to meet its needs in India."9
Aden's needs eventually led to northern Somalia becoming a British
protectorate by 1886.1' France arrived in the region at about the
same time as Britain, purchased concessions, and eventually made
full claim over what became known as French Somaliland and is now
Djibouti. 19' The Italians arrived in Southern Somalia in the late nine-
"9 Id. at 8.
16 Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 102.
187 See infra notes 188-240 and accompanying text.
18 British Somaliland (north central); French Somaliland (northwest); Italian Somaliland
(south); Ethiopian Somaliland (the Ogaden); and what came to be called the Northern Fron-
tier District (NFD) of Kenya. See SOMALIA: A COUNTRYSTUDY, supra note 176, at 3.
189 See LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 11. The British acquired Aden by force in 1839
and it was used as a coaling station on the route to India. The opening of the Suez canal and
the collapse of Egyptian authority in the African northeast dissipated British reluctance to estab-
lish a beach head in the Horn of Africa, and the British port of Aden increased in economic
and strategic importance. The British had initially attempted to retain spheres of influence in
Somaliland by aiding and abetting Egyptian authority in the northeast. They were forced, how-
ever, to deal directly with the Somalis after Egyptian influence in the region collapsed. See
CHAZAN ET AL, supra note 50, at 48-49; I. M. LEWIS, A MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA: NATION
AND STATE IN THE HORN OFAFRICA, 40-44 (1980).
190 See LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 11. The need for meat and other supplies at the
Aden coaling station, and northern Somalia's abundance of sheep, goats, camels, and cattle
brought Somalia to London's attention. Aden had few resources of its own, so it relied on
Northern Somaliland for its supply of meat. See id. at 10-11. The first formal treaties were
signed with the British government in the nineteenth century, as the Somalis sought political
protection from Britain in exchange for the export of Somali livestock to the Aden coaling sta-
tion. Muusa Bihi Cabdi, Independent Somaliland, in CISIS MANAGEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF
RECONCILIATION IN SOMALI (M. A. Mohamed Salih & Lennart Wohlgemuth eds.). Britain re-
tained a laissez-faire attitude towards its Somali colony, content to rule from afar as long as fresh
supplies of cattle continued to sail into Aden. Since the tenth century, the coastal zone of Soma-
lia had been a passageway between the "pastoral Somali hinterland and regional commercial
centers in southeastern Africa, Egypt, coastal parts of Arabia, Persia, and even faraway China."
LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 10.
191 See LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 11 (seeking Ethiopian resources and a port of call,
the French "bought concessions and eventually made full claim over [Djibouti]"). It also
wanted to infiltrate the British zone of influence that spanned from Cairo to Cape Town, and
counter high duties imposed on French goods at the port of Aden. Accordingly, France pur-
chased the port of Obock from the Afar in 1862 and established the Somaliland protectorate.
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teenth century and formally established a colony in 1893.'9- While
Britain established indirect rule, Rome sent a significant number of
Italian settlers to its colony, imposed a more direct administration
and eventually introduced elements of fascism.' 93 Ethiopia expanded
to the east in the late nineteenth century and asserted sovereignty
over the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region.94 Finally, British colonial
authorities claimed territory inhabited by Somalis in northeastern
Kenya.'9 5 Given the divisive nature of colonial conquest, early Somali
nationalists organized in opposition to colonial rule and partition,
and sought to unite the five territories into a single state.' *
The impact of European colonization partially corresponded to
LEWIS, supra note 189, at 41. Although their holdings were relatively small, the scope of French
influence within the region soon matured to be vast and impressive. French and Ethiopian in-
terests were joined both figuratively and physically. There was a constant Franco-Ethiopian
friendship in the region before and after World War 11, due to economic interdependence. A
railroad between Djibouti and Addis Ababa crossed Ethiopian territory, providing both nations
with foreign trade opportunities that were unavailable to other nations. VIRGINIA THOMPSON &
RICHARD ADLOFF, DJIBOUTI AND THE HORN OFAFRICA 104-05 (1968).
1 A relative latecomer to colonial conquest, Italy was initially distracted by its ownm national
unification which was not completed until 1870. As inexperienced imperialists, tie Italians
moved cautiously and slowly, often staking out territory only where confrontation with other
colonial powers could be avoided. This strategy brought them to Somalia, where they acquired
their first territory in 1888. See genea/ll, So.IA: A COU.NRY STUDY, supra note 176. at 11;
ROBERT HESS, ITALIAN COLONIALISM IN SOmAIA 177 (1966). Italy acquired a southeastern pro-
tectorate in 1889, later seized the Banaadir coast from the Zanzibaris, and formed the colony of
Italian Somaliland in 1893. SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 176, at 11. There were
three primary motivations for Italian expansion: "to 'relieve population pressure at home.' to
offer a 'civilizing Roman mission' to the Somalis, and to increase Italian prestige through over-
seas colonization." Id. at 14.
193 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 11. Italy developed an administrative plan for its col-
ony with intentions to establish a settler community and commercial enterprises in the region
between the Shabeelle andJubba rivers. SOMAUA: A COUNTRYSTuDy, supra note 176. at 14.
194 Rajendra Ramlogan, Towards a New Vision of World Seurity: The United Nations Setimty Coun-
cil and the Lessons of Somalia, 16 HouS. J. INT'L L 213, 217 (1993). Emperor Menelik I of
Ethiopia emerged as a regional power during the colonial era. He prevented European en-
croachment in Ethiopia and successfully challenged the Europeans for control of Somali inhab-
ited territories in the Ogaden. SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 176. at 12-13. In the
late 1890s, Ethiopia defeated Italy at the Battle of Adow-a which ensured Ethiopians continued
control over their own destiny as well as the destiny of the Ogaden. SL%1O.S, supra note 175, at
35. During the late nineteenth century, Ethiopians descended upon the lowlands of the
Ogaden and Haud to raid Somali livestock. The frequency and %irnilence of these raids partly
prompted the creation of a resistance movement led by Siad Mohammad. a Muslim cleric. In-
deed, after France, Great Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia carved up Somali lands at die end of the
nineteenth century, this fundamentalist sheik proclaimed a holy war against the Christian colo-
nizers, which lasted for twenty years. Known as the Dervish resistance movement, this campaign
spurred a nationalist resistance campaign against all invading colonial powers, which did not
end until 1920 when advances in military technology allowed Anglo-Ethiopian forces to crush
and level Dervish towns. This protracted anti-colonial rebellion, retrospectively iewed by So-
malis as a proto-nationalist movement, survived four major British military expeditions and the
first use of air strikes in colonial Africa, before it collapsed in 1920 upon the demise of Siad
Mohammed. Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 102.
195 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 11. This became known as the Northern Frontier
District.
196 Id.
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the imperial aspirations of each of the colonial powers. In general,
the greater the desire to colonize the area, the more complex the co-
lonial legacy. While all three European colonies lacked sufficient re-
sources in areas such as education and health care, and none posited
Somali self-govemment, there were differences in the resources de-
voted to these and other spheres. Britain sought only to provide sup-
plies for its coaling station in Aden and was, therefore, reluctant to
commit resources to its Somaliland Protectorate. 97  French aspira-
tions stemmed from a desire to penetrate the British sphere of influ-
ence, and consequently its ambitions were also limited in scope.9 s It-
aly, however, arrived in Somalia intending to create a full-fledged
colony, and thus, more resources were committed to its colonial en-
deavors.'99 Attempts were made to develop the Somali economy for
the benefit of the motherland, 2°° and resources were devoted to con-
structing an infrastructure to support this economic activity. 0 '
Southern Somaliland progressed towards decolonization with a per-
manent infrastructure, some educational facilities, an economy based
197 Occupied with other recent acquisitions and restrained by parliamentary demands to limit
spending, Britain remained reluctant to colonize the Horn of Africa.
Like Britain, France was content with the establishment of a prosperous port for trade and
supplies, although France attached extreme importance to the port of Djibouti throughout the
colonial period. LEWIS, supra note 189, at 181. France, however, was not zealous or optimistic
with regards to colonial governance of its protectorate, and was satisfied that the colony bi-
sected potential east - west expansion across Africa by Britain. See id at 136-38; 181.
19 Italian imperialists envisioned a place in the sun for Italy - with an influx of settlers and
the development of colonial plantations along the Shebelle andJuba Rivers in the South. See id.
at 92.
2W Initially hampered by problems with labor recruitment and the outbreak of a series of
conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalis, the Italian settlement scheme evolved slowly. The arri-
val in Somalia of new technology for tropical agriculture, however, and the commencement of
the fascist governorship of Governor De Vecchi (between 1920 and 1929), brought a renewed
sense of commitment to Italian colonial aspirations. De Vecchi brought new modes of oppres-
sive colonial rule to Somalia, which replaced the paternalist policies that characterized the first
eighteen years of Italian rule. HESS, supra note 192, at 149-180. After World War 1, Italian So-
maliland began to reflect the imperialist visions that inspired its founding. The Societal Agri-
cola Italo-Somalia (SAIS) was an agricultural consortium that produced cotton, sugar, bananas
and soap. SAIS was established after previous attempts at plantation farming failed and the
prospects of settling a large number of Italian farmers in Italialian Somaliland dimmed. LEWIS,
supra note 189, at 93. It initiated new ways to acquire land and labor by contracting directly
with Somalis rather than going through the colonial administration. The resulting system was a
co-operative 'collaboration' whereby each worker was allocated a section of land; half was for
his own use, and half was to be worked for the Company. The Italians still faced labor short-
ages, however, and often resorted to forced labor, which was bitterly resented by the Somali
people. Id. at 94-95. SAIS's success led to its methods being imitated throughout Italian So-
maliland and this resulted in new patterns of trade. Banana exports soon became the most im-
portant product, rivaling such traditional mainstays as hides and skins. Id. at 96.
The makings of a permanent infrastructure began to take shape. The Italians built routes
between plantations, eventually covering 6,400 kilometers. A small diesel railway system was
established that linked two of the larger plantations with the capital and port of Mogadishu.
LEWIS, supra note 189, at 96. A badly needed well drilling scheme to aid the nomadic sector of
the economy was initiated. One hundred and fifty wells were built and a series of irrigation
works were undertaken to improve the traditional subsistence cultivation economy. Id.
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on agriculture, and an administrative system rooted in Italian fas-
cism."' It emerged from colonialism as a poor country, but nonethe-
less in a position of economic and educational superiority vis-a-vis its
northern neighbor. This imbalance led to considerable tensions and
antagonisms upon the union of the two colonies. s In what is now
the Republic of Somaliland, the situation uras quite different." Few
resources were devoted to matters such as education,4 health care,
facilitating the existing economy,"" or building and maintaining an
infrastructure. Indirect rule emerged as the preferred method of
governance,0  and local authorities were relied on to carry out impe-
rial edicts locally.208 Little changed until after the Second World
2 The colony was divided into seven provinces or 'Regions', which contained thirt)-three
Districts and was presided over by a Resident. See HESS, supra note 192, at 149-56. The adminis-
trative system of Italian Somaliland was bureaucratic, highly centralized, and directed by the
Governor and his subordinates and secretaries in Mogadishu; Somali participation was almost
non-existent. In the Districts and Provinces, government officials (Residents) were assisted in
an advisory capacity by chiefs who were given a government stipend and were known as 'Capos.'
Capos served as vehicles for directives and instructions. Occasionally "Capos' who proved loyal
and co-operative were granted colonial decorations and financial re ards. The Civil Service as
a whole included approximately 350 expatriate Italians, and 1,700 Somalis and Arabs, employed
in a variety of subordinate positions. Italian direct rule, when implemented, resembled a ver-
sion of indirect rule, which evolved by necessity. The number of personnel stationed in die
colony was limited, and therefore, the Italians were content to limit their influence in many Dis-
tricts to putting a stop to inter-clan warfare. Id. at 180-81.
'3 SeeCHAZAN ETAL, supra note 50, at 60.
M British Somaliland is now the Republic of Somaliland. The British engaged in twenty
years of dervish wafare in the North beginning in 1899; although they eventually prevailed, it
was expensive and they were left with a hostile and distrustful population. The British govern-
ment then had to make additional funds available to develop some form of infrastructure.
LEWis, supra note 189, at 101. During the ten-years after the Dervish war, British input into the
colony consisted of opening an agriculture and veterinary office, initiating a limited well drill-
inj cheme to assist the pastoral economy, and providing a few medical services. d at 101-02.
- Lack of funds made developing an educational system difficult Although there were
plans to open six elementary schools and an intermediate school, it was to be financed by' im-
plementing a direct tax on livestock. This measure was abhorrent to Somalis and had to be
abandoned. Id. at 103. Widespread opposition to precepts that contradicted Muslim scriptures
further complicated efforts to impose western education. Consequently. proposals to institute
such systems had to await British reoccupation in 1941 after the Italians were expelled. The
upheavals of World War II had a considerable impact upon the Somali population. After the
war, there was appreciably less hostility to secularization and other forms of social change. Id.
at 132.
With no input from the British, the Somali community gradually adopted sorghum culti-
vation in the western part of the territory. Elsewhere, the nomadic economy prevailed and
sheep, goats and skins were exported. Id. at 102-103.
Somali culture made it possible to administer the colony with a relatively light hand. Id. at
104. Despite the presence of only a small group of expatriate British officials aided by Indian
and Arab clerks, the Somali clan genealogical system provided a framework through which ef-
fective indirect rule could be established. Partly because of the deep antipathy it held towards
the Somalis (for not respecting British imperial might), Britain did not formulate a plan for its
colony. Instead, the Administration's only goal w%-as to maintain law and order. id.
'N See id. at 105-06. The territory was divided into six districts and ruled from the seat of gov-
ernment at Berbera. Poor communications and long distances between stations and te capital
meant district commissioners wielded a great deal of authority. In contrast, clan elders who
demonstrated loyalty were given nominal authority and small stipends. For the most part, how-
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War,209 when trade and commerce were reestablished and efforts were
made to introduce secular education, to establish health and veteri-
nary services, and to improve the agricultural sector by digging more
wells.210 Britain decided to focus more attention on the interior and
moved the capital from Berbera to Hargeisa.2 1 In the political realm,
a Protectorate Advisory Council met, with delegates representing
most public interests.2 12 Meanwhile, indigenous political interest
swelled in regard to the future status of the Protectorate and other
Somali territories.2 3  Nonetheless, an undercurrent of antagonism
and resistance to change remained, manifesting itself in riots in 1944
and 1945.214 The administrative establishment remained inade-
quate, and the population remained uneducated and uninvolved in
many technical realms, although they did retain ancient nomadic
skills. 6 Thus, as British Somaliland moved towards independence
and unification with Italian Somalia, the North lagged behind the
South in infrastructure development, education, health care, and
participation in formal political processes. Other potential problems
loomed. While Somalis are homogeneous in many respects, they
make a number of distinctions between themselves both within and
between clan families, and many of these differentiations are tied to
migration. 7 Other distinctions include those between pastoralists,
ever, all effective power remained with District commissioners who also acted as magistrates.
From the end of the Dervish period until after the East African campaign during the Second
World War, this scenario described the general character of life in the Protectorate - Somalis
wanted to maintain the status quo and the British were in basic agreement. Id. at 106.
M With the outbreak of World War II, Italian East African forces invaded and ousted the
British from northern Somalia in August 1940. SoMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 176, at
15. The Italian victory was short-lived, however, and the British returned in March, 1941 to re-
occupy British Somaliland. Both the Somalis and the British emerged from the Second World
War with new perspectives and different ambitions. Britain was ready to abandon its policy of
maintenance in favor of more progressive policies, and Somali leaders were more open to what
was termed social progress and to secular change. As a result of these sentiments, the British
military forces that administered the Protectorate from 1941 to 1949 instituted greater political
and social changes than any of their predecessors. Id. at 15-16.
210 There was a concerted radio and mobile cinema campaign to win support for educational
services. LEWIS, supra note 189, at 133. The public response was favorable. By 1945, seven ele-
mentary schools, with more than four hundred students, and two intermediate schools, were
functioning. Public health services were extended and a school to train Somali nurses was
opened in 1945. Id. at 132-33.
2,I Id. at 132 (explaining that this decision followed from the new policy to extend adminis-
trative and social services throughout the Protectorate). See also SOMALIA: A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 176, at 16-17.
2 LEWIS, supra note 189, at 134. This council first met in 1946. Id.
213 Id.
214 Id. In 1944 and 1945, locust infestation resulted in severe land devastation. The govern-
ment initiated protective measures which the Somali population interpreted as a deliberate at-
tempt to kill Somali camels. Riots ensued, and highlighted the need for improved public rela-
tions. Id.
215 Id. Five Commissioners ran six Districts and only one was able to speak Somali.
216 Id.
217 See SIMONS, supra note 175, at 32-33.
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inter-riverine agriculturalists, and those Somalis who migrated to
coastal towns. Undoubtedly, socioeconomic differences existed in
Somalia before Europeans arrived.119 Yet the European "introduction
of indirect rule, their obsession with preventing conflict, and their
desire to enmesh Somaliland in economic interdependencies meant
that local migrations, local boundary disputes, and differences in lo-
cal modes of production were made contestable in new ways. " - The
effects continue to have repercussions today in terms of class rela-
tions, economic dependency, agrarian underdevelopment, and envi-
ronmental degradation.22' The powerful forces of the international
market, and imperialism, corroded the old Somali moral order, and
as the colonial period ended, Somalis were left with a growing diver-
gence between the internal logic and demands of a social structure
suited to a decentralized, pastoral setting on the one hand, and the
artificial, alien state and externally oriented world market system on
the other.ns
2. Towards Decolonization (1950-1960)
The different colonial experiences of British and Italian So-
maliland were also reflected in the varying methods by which these
territories prepared for decolonization. A United Nations trusteeship
218 K Pastoral clans make up approximately seventy percent of the population, and the
southern agricultural pastoral clans make up about twenty percent. SOMuJ. : A CotiNriw
STUDY, supra note 176, at 73. These clan-families evolved differently as they adapted to different
physical environments. Pastoral Somalis considered themselves superior to settled Somalis. and
lineage remained the focal point of loyalty for pastoral nomads. The southern groups devel-
oped a more heterogeneous society that accorded status to different groups on the basis of ori-
gin and occupation. Group cohesion developed a territorial dimension among the settled agri-
culturalists. Id
219 SIMONS, supra note 175, at 33.
Id Simons gives the following example:
[C]olonial officials sought to curtail pastoral sources of conflict through
more clearly defining which grazing grounds and water sources belonged
to which groups. At the same time, the very process of mapping dear lines
of usership led to intense jockeying among rival groups of Somalis before
control could be established and then, once it w-as, over whethr the new
rules were just.
Id.
Indirect rule by colonial administrations meant a variety of positions became available that were
to be staffed by Somalis. Competition over appointments exacerbated differences bemeen fac-
tions of Somalis. As Simons explains,
differential access to money, education, and property recombined with
other colonial favors to single out Somalis hired as soldiers, policemen.
clerks, and so on. These individuals, in turn, further consolidated their
status by helping their relatives share in the benefits. Splits and realign-
ments only intensified as everyone who could compete did so to insulate
kin.
Id
221 AL
= See gnera/!y LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36.
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was established in the South, and the Italian Trust Administration was
formed to administer it.225 Advancements were achieved on the edu-
cational front,2 4 while efforts to transform the economy were largely
unsuccessful.2 Both efforts dovetailed with "Somalization" in the po-
litical realm, which proceeded through a variety of mechanisms, such
as the creation of various administrative bodies and eventually elec-
tions at various levels.2 Political parties proliferated before finally
22 LEWIS & Mayall, supra note 28, at 102-03. When the Allies defeated Italy in 1941 the Itul-
ian, Ethiopian, and British colonies were brought under British military administration. Soma-
lis would be governed within a single state and prepared for self-government. This plan was
soon abandoned, however, and Somali territories resumed their former colonial status, while
the Italian colony was placed under UN trusteeship to be administered by Italy under a ten-year
mandate (1950-60). Id. The trusteeship system imposed obligations on trustees that were over-
seen by the United Nations. See generally, Gordon, Some Legal Problems, supra note 2, at 302. Italy
was obligated to "foster the development of free political institutions and to promote the devel-
opment of the inhabitants of the territory towards independence." LEWIS, supra note 189, at
139 (internal quotations omitted). Somalis were to be granted increasing responsibility for po-
litical and administrative functions, under the watchful eye of the Trust Administration and a
U.N. Advisory Council created to sit in Mogadishu. The ten year Trusteeship was scheduled to
terminate with Somali independence on or before December 2, 1960. Id. at 13940.
224 Student enrollment increased; politically specialized schools, as well as technical and
commercial institutes, were opened; and an ambitious program for overseas study was estab-
lished. LAWvRENCE FINKELSTEIN, SOMALILAND UNDER ITALIAN ADMINISTRATION: A CASE STUDY IN
UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP 16 (1955). These developments provided a stronger base in the
administrative and political realms for the ensuing transfer of authority. LEWIS, supra note 189,
at 144.
M There were, however, modest improvements in some spheres, such as infrastructure de-
velopment. Between 1950 and 1955, an annual subsidy of more than three million Italian lira
was devoted to improving roads, communications, and other public works. LEWIS, supra note
189, at 142. In 1954, a Seven Year Development Plan was launched to increase agricultural and
livestock development. Initial results were encouraging, with modest gains in the production of
cereals, cotton and sugar cane. The principle export remained the banana, however, and pro-
duction increased five fold over the pre-war years. Id. at 143. The emphasis on the banana in-
dustry allowed Italy to dominate the Somali economy. JAN M. HAAKONSEN, SCIENTIFIC
SOCIALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE: THE CASE OF SOMALIA'S "INSTANT" FISHERMAN 52 (1984). Italy,
however, was not profiting from the monopoly it held in the banana industry and Italian con-
sumers paid inflated prices. Haakonsen asserts that Italy wanted to retain economic control in
Somalia because it believed oil would be discovered there. Id. at 53. Of all the private and pub-
lic investment between 1954 and 1957, nearly half went to oil prospecting. The heavy emphasis
on the banana industry meant other agricultural sectors that could have helped to make Soma-
lis self-sufficient in food production by the time of independence were not developed. Id. at 52.
Instead, Somalia remained poor and continued to run at a serious deficit. LEWIS, supra note
189, at 143. A World Bank mission in 1957 concluded that exceptional financial assistance
would probably be needed for twenty years after independence. Id. at 143-44.
22 A national Territorial Council was created in 1950, and this political body proved to be an
active participatory forum. Id. at 144. Between 1950 and 1955, the council considered ap-
proximately 100 ordinances, covering a wide range of topics. These draft ordinances and gov-
ernment decrees were forwarded to the Trust Administration for scrutiny and discussion. Legis-
lative committees, offices, and local governmental bodies were created. In 1954, the first
municipal elections were held; seventy-five percent of the male-only electorate voted and six-
teen parties proffered candidates. Elected membership in rural councils was introduced in
1955, and by 1956 there were 48 Municipal Councils representing towns and provinces. In
1956, the Somali Territorial Council was transformed into a legislative assembly with seventy
seats and full statutory power over domestic affairs. The head of the Italian Trust Administra-
tion, however, retained the right of absolute veto. In the Assembly, the Italian and Arabian
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consolidating into five parties by 1956.
- The 1956 elections demon-
strated the dominance of the Somali Youth League (SYL) ,r
- % which
won the election, formed a government and began to tackle 
constitu-
tional questionsn and other issues.2 As southern Somalia 
proceeded
towards independence, the issue of Pan-Somalism moved to the 
fore-
front, and steps were taken towards the eventual unification 
of British
Somaliland and the Somali Trust Territory."' British Somaliland
came to unification by a different route. Absent a certain date 
for in-
dependence, preparations evolved at a much slower pace, 
and the
eventual demise of colonial rule unfolded in a kind of controlled
chaos that might have been avoided if preparations had begun 
ear-
communities were allocated four seats each, and the Indian and 
Pakistani groups %ere each
allocated one seat. Id. at 145.
2 Id. at 146. Upon returning to Somalia, the Italians initially 
deployed strong military forces
to quell potential anti-Italian uprisings. Id. at 140. The most 
vocal anti-Italian sentiment arose
from the Somali Youth League (SYL), a political movement 
founded to promote Somali inde-
pendence. Id.; E. SYLVIA PANtHURST, EX-ITALIAN SOMALILAND 
175-84 (Greenwood Press 1969)
(1951). The SYL established commercial and agricultural 
companies, anti-disease control
boards, language classes and other programs to benefit 
the Somali people. pANKEMRHLMST. su-
pra, at 177. The British Protectorate preferred the SYL. I& 
And, after some initial enmity, the
Italian Administration also found itself encouraging those elements 
of the SYL which it consid-
ered to be moderate. SeeLEVis, supra note 189, at 146.
L8 ILIS, supra note 189, at 146. In the 1956 national election, the SYL won 43 of the 60
available seats. LEWIS, supra note 189, at 146. It was called upon 
to form a government under
'Abdilahi' Ise. I& The SYL retained its political preeminence, 
winning 416 of 663 seats in the
1958 municipal elections, and tventy-two of the twenty-nine 
contested seats in the 1959 national
elections. In the 1958 election, women finally were permitted 
to vote. Id. at 158-60.
Constitutional questions generated political objections 
both inside and outside of the
SYL The SYL favored a unitary state with a high degree 
of centralized authority, vlufle other
parties sought a type of federal relationship that would permit 
a high degree of regional auton-
omy. A break-away section of the SYL formed the Greater 
Somali League (GSL) which pushed
for a more militant stance with regard to the Pan-Somali issue. 
Id. at 157-58.
2" A number of vexing questions faced the Ise government 
in the years leading to independ-
ence, and measures were inaugurated to combat perceived 
problems. Attempts were made to
separate secular and religious jurisdictions, and numerous 
provisions were enacted to weaken
the continued vitality of collective dan solidarity, I& at 
155-56. Statutes prohibited political
parties from bearing tribal names and judicial procedures 
were modified to place a stronger
emphasis on individual rather than collective punishments. 
Somali District Commissioners
were granted temporary judicial powers to enforce legislative measures. 
The government also
faced the task of preparing a constitution for the independent 
state, and a decree passed in
September, 1957 set up two committees to study the problem. 
One committee was political and
the other, which included Italian advisors, was technical. 
African states that had already
achieved independence were to serve as models. Id.
231 Id. at 161. Following the 1959 election, Ise moved the 
Pan-Somali issue to the forefront of
his party's program. In December, 1959, the U.N. adopted 
a resolution terminating Somalia's
trusteeship status as of July 1, 1960, which was several months 
ahead of the previously set date.
Id. at 162. This announcement intensified the clamor for 
independence and unification with
the North. Informal talks between Northern and Southern 
leaders were transformed into for-
mal agreements in 1960 when Somalia's constitution 
was completed. Id. at 163. The Republic
would be a unitary state with one flag, one president. one 
parliament, and one government. It
was agreed that an elected president would serve as head 
of state, and that the state would be
governed by a prime minister and council of ministers who 
were responsible to a legislative as-
sembly. The administrative, judicial and economic 
systems of the two territories would con-
tinue to function separately until integration. Id.
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lier. Local and national politics developed slowly, 23 and politicalactivity in the Protectorate remained dormant until Britain relin-quished control of the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1956.24 This led to anupsurge in political activity and mounting demands for autonomy.3The Protectorate's first legislative council was formed in 1957 and re-constituted to include elected Somali representatives in 1959.36 Callsfor unification with the Southern Trusteeship24 7 led to a resolutionrequesting immediate independence and union with Somalia; theBritish willingly complied.2 4  Independence finally came on June 26,1960.239 Five days later, British Somaliland became independent andunited with Somalia.240 The new Republic's constitution was to be
232 Id. at 148. Moreover, valuable collaborative opportunities between the Italian and British
were not possible because unification was rushed. Id. On the other hand, it also has been ar-gued that had preparatory negotiations between Italy and Britain been held, they would haveled to a clash of diverse interests, and thus might have inhibited unification. See generally SAADIATOuvAL, SOMAL NATIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE DRIVE FOR UNITY IN THE
HORN OFAFPIcA 111 (1963).
233 The Local Authorities ordinance enacted in 1950 allowed the governor to appoint localauthorities to serve as a link between district commissioners and the people. LENVIS, supra note189, at 149. Town and district councils were initiated, and those in Berbera and Hargeisaquickly acquired a measure of financial responsibility. At the national level, an Advisory Coun-cil met twice a year to discuss a widening range of issues. Id. at 150.234 Id. at 150-151. Numerous Somalis live, and graze and water livestock, in the Ogaden. TheOden, or Haud, is a contested region between Somalia and Ethiopia. Id.One response was the formation of the National United Front, which was supported byboth the SYL and the Somali National League (SNL). Id. at 151. It sought recovery of theHaud and independence for the Protectorate. In 1956, the British Government responded tonationalist calls for political participation by announcing that the pace towards self-governmentwould be accelerated and representative government would gradually be introduced. The Brit-ish government also indicated that it would not stand in the way of the eventual union with So-
malia. Id.
236 Id. at 152-53. The Council contained twelve elected members, fifteen nominated officialmembers, and two nominated unofficial members, with the governor serving as President. Id.237 In 1959, delegates from all the parties and political groups in British Somaliland met inMogadishu to form the National Pan-Somali Movement. Id. at 155.The Legislative Council unanimously passed the resolution on April 6, 1960. Id. at 162.The Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons five days later that his governmentwas sympathetic to the Somali request, and on May 4, 1960, the Colonial Secretary announcedarrangements that would allow the Protectorate to become independent by July 1, 1960.Hence, the British took full advantage of the opportunity to rid itself of one of its least reward-ing possessions. Id. at 162-63. Britain also feared that if independence was delayed, southernSomali dominance would be further strengthened once the North finally gained independence.
SeeTouvAL, supra note 232, at 111.239 LEWIS, supra note 189, at 164.
240 Id. In 1960, Britain relinquished its sovereignty over British Somaliland, creating the In-dependent State of Somaliland, which merged with the UN Trust Territory of Somalia. Cabdi,supra note 190, at 83. The territories united on the basis of their previous agreements and metin a joint legislative session at Mogadishu to officially create the Republic of Somaliland. Thetwo legislatures merged into one National Assembly of the Somali Republic with Aden AbdullaOsman as provisional President of the Republic. Osman was a prominent leader of the SYL andformer President of the Legislative Assembly of Somalia. See TOUVAL, supra note 232, at 112.Six days later, Jama Abdullahi Galib, a leading member of the northern SNL party, was electedPresident by the Assembly. Forming a government, however, proved to be more difficult.Three weeks after Galib's election, the new Somali Republic had a government which repre-
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ratified by a national referendum to be held a year later. Amid an
atmosphere charged with nationalistic and patriotic fervor, the new
government tumed to the Republic's many problems.
C. The Somali Republic 1960-1967
The Somali Republic began its existence with a constitution and
political structure that were typical in new African Republics 24' The
President was to serve as head of state and commander in chief of the
armed forces, the National Assembly was vested with legislative power,
and the judicial branch was to be independent of the other two
branches of government24 The constitution included an extensive
bill of rights and created local municipal and district councils.'
Nonetheless, the south soon emerged as the dominant region and
northern discontent and resentment escalated.2" Northern soldiers
quickly, albeit unsuccessfully, rebelled ' and the national government
sented a reasonable balance of northern and southern interests. Ministerial positions were al-
located to parallel closely the ratio of northern (33) and southern (90) seats in the National
Assembly. After a complex political struggle within the SYL, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a
southern opposition leader within the SYL, wms named Prime Minister. Se grneraly TOtVAL.
su-ja note 232, at 113; LEWIS, supra note 189, at 165-66.
The constitution, however, was not without controversy. Northerners manifested their
discontent and resentment in the national constitutional referendum held on June 20, 1961.
The northern SNL party organized a boycott which resulted in a total vote ofjust over 100,000
in the North, half of which were negative. In the south, more than 1.5 million people voted in
favor of the constitution, and only slightly more than 100.000 against it. LEwIS, supra note 189.
at 172.
24 CHRITAN P. POTHOLM, FOUR AFRICAN POLmQcAL SYfEMS 188 (1970). The National As-
sembly chose the President for a six-year term, with a limit of two consecutive terms. The Presi-
dent was given the authority to summon and dismiss Parliament. call and retire the Cabinet,
and ratify treaties. The National Assembly consisted of 123 members who were elected for five-
year terms by universal adult suffrage. Although legislative authority was vested in the Assembly,
bills could also be introduced to the legislature by the President or a group of 10,000 voters.
The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers were responsible to the National Assembly.
The constitution intentionally kept the judicial branch independent of the executive and legis-
lative branches. This branch consisted of a Supreme Court that possessed civil, criminal, ad-
ministrative, and accounting jurisdiction. I& See gm /lly PAOLO CONTNI, TIIE SO.tAJ
REPUBLIC: AN EXPERIMENT IN LEGAL INTEGRATION 16-19 (1969).
243 See POTHOL1, supra note 242; CONTINI, supa note 242.
2 See HAAKONSEN, supra note 225, at 54. Because the population was larger in the south. ir
held a majority of the parliamentary seats. Southerners also had more experience administer-
ing a modem state because Britain did not allow political parties in governing councils until
1959. Id. Thus, politicians from the south took most of the new government posm These posts
included the president, prime minister, more than two-thirds of the senior cabinet posts, and
the two top posts in the military and police forces. LYONs & SA.IATAR. supra note 36, at 12. The
north also sacrificed more than the south upon unification. Hargeisa was reduced from the
status of capital to that of a provincial headquarters, thus initiating a flow of business and pros-
perity towards the new capital in the south. This economic impact was further aggravated by a
marked increase in unemployment in the north which accompanied the withdrawal of promi-
nent British officials after independence. L L Lewis, Intgration in the Soralh Republic, in
AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION: CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLIIcAL UNION
273 (Arthur Hazlewood ed.,1967).
24 Some northerners felt betrayed by the actions of southern politicians after independence
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made efforts to include the north in the new nation in a more mean-
ingful way.246 Changes in the political realm led to the channeling of
northern resentments more directly into the political arena and the
formation of an organized opposition party.2 41 Joining two different
administrative, judicial and economic systems proved to be a more
formidable task, however. Besides problems of distance and commu-
nication,248 difficulties emerged in merging bureaucracies, consolidat-
ing fiscal and accounting procedures, unifying judicial procedures,
and combining police and military forces. Linguistic differences
and feared that their region would now become a neglected outpost, especially when the
northern capital of Hargeisa was nearly one thousand dirt road miles from the capital of Moga-
dishu. LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 12. A group of northern soldiers arrested their
southern superiors in a military coup in 1961. The fact that the coup did not receive strong
sympathy in the north or the south indicates that nationalistic sentiment dominated regional
resentment. Although the people of the north wanted change, destruction of the Republic
went too far. While the coup was technically a failure, it finally succeeded in prompting a slug-
gish government into action. LEWIS, supra note 189, at 173-74.
Personnel in all branches of government service were more often posted on a national
basis, and the government enacted a Civil Service Law unifying salaries and conditions of serv-
ice. This resulted in pay increases for many northern civil servants. See LEWIS, supra note 189, at
174. The government adopted new fiscal and accounting procedures, based on northern pro-
totypes, and numerous development projects and industries for the north, including moderniz-
ing the Hargeisa airport, constructing hospitals, and introducing mechanized wheat and sor-
ghum farming schemes. The Assembly passed legislation extending universal suffrage to the
north and unified regulations governing municipal and rural district councils. By the end of
1963, the government completed the monumental task of establishing a uniform legal code. See
id at 175, 178.
247 A more organized and powerful parliamentary opposition party, the Somali National
Congress (SNC), emerged. Northerners channeled their resentment directly into the political
arena through this party. The SNC wanted to bring down the SYL, but not to divide the Repub-
lic. Because the integrity of the Republic was not in serious jeopardy after three years of inde-
pendence, Somali officials could turn their attention to another Somali political objective -
bringing all Somali nationals living outside of the Republic into the national fold. See id. at 175-
79.
248 The distance between the capital, Mogadishu, and the administrative center of the North-
ern Region was approximately 530 miles. For many months after unification no direct tele-
phone link connected them and there were only two flights each week. By automobile, the trip
took about three days and was frequently impossible because of poor road conditions. TOUVAL,
sura note 232, at 114.
9 Civil servants in the north had less experience in senior posts then those in the south;
however, they were better trained, received higher salaries, and were able to avoid the politics
and corruption that reportedly plagued their southern counterparts. Id. Although integration
required accommodations from both sides, the many Italian and British officials remaining in
the country after independence as technical experts were opposed to changing their adminis-
trative systems and tended to hinder rather than facilitate compromise. LEWIS, supra note 189,
at 171. Thejudiciary presented a different set of problems. Unification did not pose many dif-
ficulties at the lower levels, but new forms of appellate review were necessary to replace colonial
High Courts. The legal system in the north was based primarily on English common law and
statutes and the Indian Penal Code, while in the south, it was based on Islamic law. See TOUVAL,
supra note 232, at 115. Merging fiscal and accounting procedures was equally complex because
of vastly divergent procedural differences. Combining the police and military forces was diffi-
cult because of differences in equipment and training traditions. All of these changes were ac-
complished despite the fact that previously, the Somalis had never been united into a single
state, were economically weak, and did not possess a national script. See COLIN LEGUM & BILL
LEE, CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 31 (1977) (discussing the roots of Somali nationalism).
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and lack of a national script also aggravated attempts at integrationf"'
Moreover, all of these changes had to be attained in a new and eco-
nomically weak state."'
Ultimately, parliamentary democracy proved to be a failure in
Somalia. While a detailed assessment of the events leading to the ul-
timate downfall of the Republic is beyond the scope of this paper, it is
possible to postulate that a combination of factors led to its demise.
Clanism assisted in mediating between the government and the peo-
ple, but also led to the espousal of narrow political interestsf 2 The
burning desire of Somalis to unite all Somalis in one country and un-
der one flag was overwhelming and drove many political decisions.!"
2W Somali is a spoken language, and each region used a different Iritten language; English
in the north and Italian in the south. TOUVAL, supra note 232. at 114. These linguistic differ-
ences, and the lack of a national script, aggravated attempts at integration in all spheres of activ-
ity. No civil servants and few senior officials and politicians were bilingual. Consequently, let-
ters, memoranda, and other documents were not comprehensible from region to region
without the aid of a competent translator. Unfortunately, translators and interpreters were vir-
tually impossible to find. LEVIS, supra note 189, at 171. Business transactions between regions.
already complicated by differences in currencies and tariffs, were made even more difficult by'
the inability to provide adequate documentation. Moreover. Somalia lacked the binding influ-
ence that a national language and script creates among a people and a nation. Id. at 170-71.
Professor Laitin suggests that language policy often has an important impact on the lcel and
degree of political participation, as wel as on political thought and culture. Sr DA\1D D.
LArtiN, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 3 (1977). Unfortunately, attempts to choose an
official language or a national script engendered heated opposition, and the issue %as shehed.
Somali politics and the society as a whole paid dearly for not designating a national language
and script. Id. at 222 (discussing the consequences of choosing a national script).
2 The economies of the two territories were competitive rather thian complimentary, and
less than one percent of either region's trade was with the other. Tarrif and currency differ-
ences further restricted movement of goods and services between regions. St grneralt LEGUM
& LEE, supra note 249, at 31; ToUVAL, supra note 232, at 116.
252 LEWIS, supra note 244, at 257-59. Clan organizations were pressure and interest groups,
and provided vital feedback between the central government and society as a whole. Somali
society could afford particular and local attachments given the overall societal homogeneity and
general agreement on the goals of the political system. Somalis were also quite nationalistic.
which would prove to be invaluable in overcoming differences and focusing attention on na-
tional goals. See POTHOL1, supra note 242, at 207-08.
This is not to say, however, that these two factors were always complimentary or mutuall
exclusive. "Clanism" sometimes blocked effective national unity. At other times, nationalism
directed government military policy and forced the depletion of valuable resources in the
struggle to free all Somalis. There were Somalis in French Somaliland (present day Djibouti)
in the Northen Frontier District of Kenya, and, as has been previously mentioned, in the Ethio-
pian Ogaden. See i4. at 209. In the end, the traditions that helped unify Somalia would one dai
tear it apart.
25 Pan-Somalism greatly influenced the new nation's course and peneated every sector of
Somali society. From the outset, one of the primary objectives of the Somali goveninent Was to
bring Somalis living outside the Republic into the national fold and the Republic's ten' forma-
tion "was celebrated as a only a partial victory in the pursuit of full nationhood.- LEGtUt & LEE,
supra note 249, at 31. The flag had five stars that represent the five regions that Somali nation-
alists wished to join under one nation. The constitution included an article which read: "The
Somali Republic shall promote, by legal and peaceful means, te union of Somali temto-
ries.... " LEWIS, supra note 189, at 269 n.17. This keen national consciousness can be attrib-
uted to several factors. One was resentment of alien governments, whose riles and regulations
often placed incomprehensible burdens upon the Somali's nomadic way of life. Islamic relig-
1999]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
On the one hand, Somali nationalism proved to be a unifying force,
while on the other, it ultimately proved to be futile and led to ill-
advised foreign forays, a burgeoning military,2  and explosive ten-
sions with neighboring countriessss The failure of these foreign ven-
tures directly affected political policies and fortunes back home. '
There were also grave difficulties with post-independence institu-
tions and the men who led them. "Many [leaders] of the generation
ious beliefs were a second factor which made acceptance and allegiance to non-Muslim nile
humiliating. TOUVAL, supra note 232, at 61-62. Finally, common language and ancestry created
a Somali homogeneity that reinforced the not unreasonable Somali belief that they are all de-
cedents of a common clan and should be united in a common nation. LEWiS, supra note 244, at
257-59.
25 During the 1960's, Somalia expanded its armed forces at rapid rate. It received substan-
tial military aid from the USSR, after a disastrous encounter with Ethiopia in 1963-1964, and
built its military to a standing army of 20,000. LEGUM AND LEE, supra note 249, at 32. Somalia
received more aid than any country in the Horn, and had a higher military budget than almost
any other country in Africa. See PAUL B. HENZE, THE HORN OF AFRICA FROM WAR TO PEACE 95-
100 (1991).
255 Somalis in French Somaliland, Ethiopia and the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) in
Kenya were not in a position to unite with the Republic. France was determined not to make
concessions on sovereignty and regarded the Pan-Somali movement as a threat to be resisted as
firmly as possible. General de Gaulle announced in 1959 that France attached extreme impor-
tance to the port ofJibuti and had no intention of relinquishing control over it. France was also
allied with Ethiopia. LEWIS, supra note 189, at 181. In the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden re-
gions, there were no avenues available to express Somali nationalist aspirations. Party politics
were prohibited and overt expressions of Somali nationalist sentiment were dealt with firmly.
There were an escalating number of rebellious incidents and this tense situation was further
exacerbated when Ethiopia and Somalia failed to reach an agreement on a mutual frontier.
After 1961, the Somalis established the Western Somali Liberation Front and recruited Somalis
living in Ethiopia for military training. LEGUM & LEE, supra note 249, at 33; LEWIS, supra note
189, at 182.
Additionally, because Britain willingly facilitated the union of British Somaliland and the
Italian Trusteeship, the Republic assumed Britain would do the same with its Somali subjects in
the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. See LEWIS, supra note 189, at 185. When the ban on
political organizations was lifted in Kenya in 1960, Somalis immediately mobilized within the
N.F.D. for unification with the Somali Republic. The government abided by the principles laid
down in the Republic's constitution and limited their actions to peaceful diplomacy with the
British, although the general populace clamored for more decisive action. The British ordered
a study of the problem by a N.F.D. Commission and gave the impression it would honor its find-
ings. Nonetheless, when the commission determined that the overwhelming majority of the
people in the N.F.D. wished to be united with the Republic of Somalia, Britain decided that it
would not support any claim that would effect the territorial integrity of French Somaliland,
Kenya or Ethiopia. In the face of angry public opinion and mounting opposition in the gov-
ernment, Somalia formally severed relations between the Republic and Britain in 1963. The
Pan-Somali struggle left Somalia politically isolated in Pan-African affairs. The desire to move
from nationhood to statehood ran counter to the process of nationalism in other African states,
where elites were passionately attached to colonially defined boundaries. The Pan-Somali
movement threatened Somalia's neighbors' territorial sovereignty, and, as a result, Kenya and
Ethiopia signed a mutual defense agreement in 1964. Id. at 185-99. Somalia's goals set it at
odds with its neighbors and allies in the West, and led to a potential alliance with the East.
LEGUM & LEE, supra note 249, at 32. Moreover, with each failed attempt to bring one of the
stars back into the fold, the Republic experienced political discontent and economic ramifica-
tions at home. Id
25 The government was accused of not providing strong leadership on the Northern Fron-
tier District and doing a poorjob managing domestic affairs. LEWIs, supra note 244, at 275.
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that brought independence to Somalia were men who grew up under
the shadow of British and Italian colonialism."2 7  These leaders
viewed the independence enterprise as an opportunity to individually
profit in the emerging state. Constructing public institutions to ad-
dress the immense challenges confronting them was an afterthought
at best.2 As members of the regime and their cronies made a rush
for individual gain, the post-independence political landscape failed
to address the interests of the Somali populace as a whole. "Mesmer-
ized by the ease with which they were able to generate foreign aid to
mitigate deficits and support development plans, few gave much con-
sideration to the productive sectors of the economy or to the plight
of the average Somali. "29s Because the state was seen as the most stra-
tegic source of private wealth, myriad political parties were created to
gain membership to the regime." In the chase for spoils, national
and local issues were rarely debated. - ' On the contrary, to ensure at-
tention and victory, candidates identified their campaigns with sub-
clan interests. These tactics accelerated the demise of kinship and Is-
lamic strictures, and encouraged the rise of clanism. '2 Consequently,
clan allegiance was sharpened, rather than diminished, by alloing
clan participation in a centralized state that, in turn, provided a new
and enlarged arena for clan competition and conflict." Thus, while
early elections indicated a growing unity within Somalia and seemed
to indicate the relative success of parliamentary democracy, " faction-
alism,2t the political machinations of the elite to retain power, and
257 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 12.
2 See id
2S Id.
Id. at 12. Parties multiplied before elections and then disappeared; few had national
standing. For example, eighteen parties took part in the first post-independence national elec-
tions of 1964, which were accompanied by sharp accusations of corruption and fraud. Only
three parties (the Somali Democratic Union (SDU), the Somali National Congress (SNC), and
the Somali Youth League (SYL)) had any national standing. The SYL emerged as the victor.
winning sixty-nine out of 123 seats. In an attempt to gain favor with the ruling party, twenty-one
deputies from competing partiesjoined the SYL soon after the National Assembly convened. In
the 1969 election, more than sixty parties supported more than 1.000 candidates to vie for 122
seats. Fearful of a splintering vote, the regime openly raided the treasury to buy votes and pres-
sured the chief of the National Police Force to put his troops and logistics at the disposal of SYL
party faithful. Finally, in order to suit the ruling party's interests, electoral rules were changed
from proportional representation to a winner-takes-all model. Id.
261 id.
2 I d .
- Lnwis & MAYAL, supra note 28, at 103.
2" There was strong participation by the opposition party in the 1963 and 1964 elections.
These elections also indicated how far Somalia had come in resolving the north-south division.
The new prime minister was from the south, but a third of those whom he invited to join his
cabinet were northerners. But see LYONS & SA.tATAR. supm note 36. at 12 (indicating that
northerners were dissatisfied with their limited representation in the new government).
2 The re-emergence of small group factionalism coincided with growsing public frustration
over the failed Pan-Somali struggle and with the search for economic independence. The in-
surgency in the Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District failed to move either closer to un-
ion with Somalia, and the Pan-Somali movement left the Republic as an exile in African affairs.
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widespread corruption and disregard for the needs and desires of the
general populace ultimately contributed to the demise of the Repub-
lic.
The first nine years of independence did not create a state that
was accountable and responsive to the challenges facing Somali soci-
ety.26 Despite the veneer of nationalism that witnessed its birth in
1960, the postcolonial state remained quaqmired in the odious prac-
tices and characteristics of its colonial predecessors.267 The institu-
tions inaugurated in 1960 gave play to the rivalries of a clan-
structured society and incited these rivalries with new methods and
resources. Consequently, within a few years of independence, Soma-
lia possessed no fewer than 60 parliamentary parties, none of which
was, or in reality could become, more than a mask for clan rivalries.u1
Massive corruption unavoidably followed.2 69 After a decade of par-
liamentary democracy, the seething tensions of antagonistic clans
provided the setting for the military coug of October 1969, led by
army commander Mohammed Siad Barre.
D. The Regime Of Siad Barre
After coming to power, Siad Barre proceeded to consolidate his
personal power and build an autocratic regime." Relying on the
concept of "scientific socialism,"27 2 Barre outlawed all clan behavior.
Yet, his power base was firmly rooted in various family clans within
the Darod clan family, and this clan eventually came to dominate the
Moreover, the immense military budget completely stagnated the government and the econ-
omy. See TON R. FARER, WAR CLOUDS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA 90-110 (1976). Prime Minister
Igal decided to shift strategies and pursue a more conciliatory form of diplomacy. Although
meetings with Kenyan and Ethiopian leaders opened new trade routes that would assist with
economic difficulties, Igal was denounced as a traitor at home, and he and other government
officials decided to utilize every legal and illegal resource at their disposal to insure victory in
the 1969 elections. See LEWIs, supra note 189, at 203 (discussing Igal's conciliatory policies);
GHAUB, supra note 31, at 65-88 (discussing the downfall of Somalia's last civilian government).
266 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 14.
267 Id. at 12.
268 Adam, supra note 4, at 69. In the national elections of 1969, the SYL won 73 seats, the
Somali National Congress (SNO) eleven, and the remainder went to smaller parties. LYONS &
SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 13. Almost 50 candidates challenged the election results, but the
Supreme Court used a technicality to find that they lacked legal authority to adjudicate the is-
sue. Id. As the new parliament convened, it was clear that fairness and constitutionality had
been greatly compromised. Each deputy was set on retrieving his campaign expenses and se-
curing a favorable place in the distribution of power and privilege, and little attention was paid
to the needs of the society at large. All but one member joined the ruling SYL and Somalia be-
came a one-party state. Id.
269 DAVIDSON, THE SEARCH FOR AFRICA, supra note 120, at 284.
270 LYONS & SAMATAR, supra note 36, at 14.
271 Adam, supra note 4, at 70.
Scientific socialism was a Marxist ideology that outlawed all forms of clannish behavior.
LEwiS & MAYALL, supra note 28, at 103.
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Somali state to an extent that was unprecedented in Somali history.m
Barre launched mass organizations to mobilize young people,
women, and other social sectors in support of the new nationalism
and the new govemment. 4 Urban and rural literacy campaigns were
launchedf 5 programs to educate girls were established, and laws were
passed in the mid-seventies that recognized women as fully compe-
tent legal persons2 6 Expanded health and education services were
offered and self-help community projects were encouraged. .- At the
same time, however, civil society was repressed in the name of sup-
pressing clan activity.m "The era of creative sociocultural experi-
ments lasted until 1977-1978, the year of the Ogaden war with Ethio-
pia, the abrogation of the USSR/Somali Treaty of Friendship, and
the search for a Somali-American alliance."* It w%-as also the begin-
ning of the end for the Barre regime and the launch of Somalia's
long descent into statelessness.28o
IV. THE BIRTH OF SOMALILAND
Siad Barre was driven from power in 1991, and after his defeat,
the Somali National Movement (SNM) "s ' began administering what
was once British Somaliland.2 In May 1991, the SNM declared that
this territory would henceforth be known as the independent Repub-
lic of Somaliland.20 Somaliland has yet to be formally recognized by
2A Id at 103-04. The dans were his own clan (Darod), his mother's clan (Ogaden) and the
clan of his brother in law, who was commander of the secret police. These three clans all be-
longed at a higher segmentary level to the Darod clan-family which had hijacked the Somali
state and now dominated all of the other clans. It
24 Somalia became independent in 1960. For nine years it enjo)ed a stable democratic goN-
ernment. "In 1969, after allegations of fraud by the elected government. Major General Mo-
hammed Siad Barre came to power through a military coup.... ' Eckert. supra note 19, at 283.
2 Adam, supra note 4, at 70.
26 At the same time, however, the paramilitary "Victory Pioneers" were repeatedly implicated
in the rape of women. ItL
rn Id. at 71.
M This included political undertakings and labor organization.
2 t at 70 (citation omitted).
See i&. at 71-76 (highlighting the main factors that led to the collapse of the Somali state).
281 The Somali National Movement (SNM), composed largely of men from the Isaaq dan-
family, was founded in London in 1981. It launched a full scale offensive against the regime of
Siad Barre in 1988. See Mohamed Saleh Bali, Somaliland:An Introduaion, Winter 1996 / 1997, at
12-14 (internet edition) (visited Sept. 18, 1998), <http://ww.anaserve.com/-mbali/web.
html.>.
The independent Republic of Somaliland is commensurate with the former colonial terri-
tory of British Somaliland as it existed prior to its independence and subsequent union with
Italian Somaliland in 1960. It is bordered by Djibouti to the West, Ethiopia to the South, and
Somalia to the East. See it at 1-2.
nWhen the SNM took control of Somaliland in 1991, public opinion w split on inde-
pendence. After years of genocidal policies emanating from Mogadishu, and Ali Mahdi's acces-
sion to power, popular sentiment began to lean towards cutting ties uith the south. Se. Amina
Warsame & Maria Brons, Somaliland: A State in Pursuit of Pere and Stabili, in CRLsis
MANAGEMENT AND THE PoLmTICS OF RECONCILIATION IN SO. NLUA STATE-MIE'FS OF UPPS%.Ak
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any other States or by the various bodies and agencies of the United
Nations.8 The new nation was faced with rebuilding a country that
had been devastated by war,28 and devising a government that would
direct that reconstruction. At the Burao conference, where the So-
maliland Republic was born, a two year transitional government was
established to govern while a constitution was drafted.2 s  Representa-
tives from all clans attended the conference, and unanimously de-
FORUM, 17-19 (January 1994). Somalilanders had long been dissatisfied with the economic,
political and cultural bias that generally disfavored the north since union of the north and
south in 1960. Chris Searle, Agony and Struggle in Northern Somalia, 34 RAcE & CLASs 2, 2 (1992).
The Republic of Somaliland possesses all of the indicia of statehood, including a permanent
population and territory, the capacity to engage in international relations, and a government.
Somaliland has declared independence; adopted a constitution and a flag; repeatedly sought
diplomatic recognition; adopted a coat of arms and a national anthem; consolidated its national
territory; elected a national assembly and a head of state; and issued currency, stamps, and
passports. Bali, Somaliland. An Introduction, supra note 281. In addition, it has a functioning
administration, a police force, a civil service, and an army. See Holding on in Somaliland: Four
Years After Independence, International Recognition is Still Lacking, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Mar. 31,
1995 at 6 [hereinafter Holding on in Somaliland]. Finally, it has a busy port at Berbera with sub-
stantial livestock exports that are the backbone of its struggling economy. SeeJulie Flint, So-
maliland. Struggling to Survive, AFR. REP.,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 38.
[T]he United Nations Development Programme has set up four offices in
the north and one in the south .... [A]lmost all of the European coun-
tries (including Italy, which has tended to side with Somalia) are giving as-
sistance to Somaliland through voluntary aid agencies. Somaliland has also
established very good relations with the new Ethiopian government and
has offered the use of its Berbera port ....
Alan Rake, Somaliland: Rebuildingfrom Scratch (visited Dec. 1991) <http://www.anaserve.com/
-mbali/rakel.hun>.
Somaliland has achieved a degree of "acceptance" and, as a result, does get
a little aid, including from Britain and Germany. Recognition, though,
remains improbable. Britain, for example ... , is not strongly opposed to
recognition, it just isn't interested enough to do more than "accept" the
situation. Like the UN, the United States still talks in terms of national
unity.
Holding on in Somaliland, supra note 283, at 6. Despite the lack of international recognition,
Somaliland has maintained firm and watchful, but generally peaceful, relations with its three
historically hostile neighbors, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia, and it continues to play a role in
the Horn of Africa. Recognizing the probable permanence of Somaliland, the United States
has established a full-time desk officer at its embassy in Djibouti. See Bali, Somaliland: An Intro-
duction, supra note 281, at 25.
[I]t was the northern-Somali population who paid most in death and suf-
fering when the government responded to the rebellion by bombarding
the North, leaving Hargeisa and Burao in rnbbles. The wells used by the
northern-Somali pastoralists were poisoned, the fruit plantations uprooted
and agricultural equipment looted. More than 50,000 people died as a re-
sult of the government bombardment of towns and massacres committed
by ground forces taking revenge against the Isak population. Another
500,000 fled to neighbouring Ethiopia, where UNHCR installed eight
refugee camps. The whole country, and especially towns such as Hargeisa
and Burao and important trading routes, were systematically strewn with
anti-personnel mines. The mines killed and disabled thousands of people,
often children who were not aware of the danger.
Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 23 (citations omitted).
Bali, Somaliland:An Introduction, supra note 281, at 18.
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cided that the SNM would lead theoprovisional government, with Ab-
durahman Ahmed Ali at the helm.2 As SNM guerillas began to es-
tablish a government, clan rivalries within the Issaq federation made
the exercise of authority problematic.!" Leadership then reverted to
clan elders who employed traditional diplomacy to initiate a series of
peace conferences that gradually restored a relative peace through-
out the regon.n Resorting to traditional peace-keeping methods,
the Guurti, religious leaders, politicians, intellectuals, social groups,
and business communities, representing every clan, met in a series of
conferences to explore the possible mechanisms to end conflicts that
had been exacerbated by years of clan manipulation under Siad
Barre2 " Peaceful dialogue was mandated, in lieu of force, as a means
to settle disputes; increased responsibility was laid upon those com-
mitting acts of violence; and legal contracts, which presently define
political and socioeconomic relations between clans in northern So-
malia, were promulgated.2 " Elders, garads, and sultans played a vital
role in preventing the political process from disintegrating, and
proved to be sources of guidance to their constituents. In addition
they served as important counsel to both political leaders and SNM
commandersl s Nonetheless, clan fighting resurfaced one year after
28 See id.
22 During the conflict between the SNM and the forces of Siad Barre, the
SNM forces were structured in such a way that each regiment belonged to
a certain clan and operated in its home area. This is how the liberation
struggle could be pursued without salaried fighters; the militia were sup-
ported by their kin.... Most of the armed militia have been brought un-
der control by the elders and peace committees of their respective com-
munities, but there are still some armed gangs, knoun as "dayday." which
pose a threat to public safety.
Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 26.
8 Cabdi, supra note 190, at 84. However, security problems posed by freelance armed gangs
continued. SeeWarsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 26.
29 The "Guurti" is the Council of Elders. SreBali, Somaliland. An Infrodudion, supra note 281.
at 15.
2 Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 24 (discussing initiatives taken by Somaliland's clan
elders to foster stability in the post-war state).
M Id.
28 Cabdi, supra note 190, at 84.
The indispensable role of the Guurti in maintaining tie stability of the
post-war state is evident in the share they take in running the county's af-
fairs. According to Article 10 of the National Charter, which as endorsed
on 25 April 1993 by the participants of the Borama Conference, the state
structures of Somaliland are composed of
1. Golaha Guurtida (Council of Elders or first chamber)
2. Golaha WVakiillada (Constituent Assembly or second chanber)
3. Colaha Xukuumadda (Goverment, or executive power)
In case of circumstances preventing the state bodies from performing their
national duties, the Council of elders has full authority to convene a con-
ference, representing all the communities of Somaliland, to decide on po-
litical measures to solve outstanding problems.... [Tiraditional legiti-
macy... gives the Council of Elders a central role in Somaliland's present
and future political structure.
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the interim president, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, assumed power, as each
clan sought to attain its share of very limited resources. 4 In February
1991, a conference was convened to promote peace between rival fac-
dons. At this meeting, a group of elders was selected to resolve future
disputes before they erupted into violence."' This meeting proved to
be a turning point in the search for national peace and in the at-
tempt to organize the country at its center.296 In early 1993, represen-
tatives from the Isaaq clan, minority clans, and members of the gov-
ernment met at a gathering of the national Guurti. Their goal was to
design a form of government that would prevent political groups
from engaging in violent conflict2 7 At a June, 1993 conference in
Borama, clan elders negotiated a peace agreement to end the civil
war in Somaliland. They also devised constitutional guidelines that
included a two-tier government, a Supreme Court, and an independ-
ent judiciary.295 The new government elected the former premier of
Somalia, Mohamad Haji Egal as President.2 This transitional gov-
ernment was given until May of 1995 to organize a referendum and
establish a commission to prepare a draft constitution.Y In mid
1996, the Council of Elders permitted new political parties to register,
in anticipation of the assumption of power in the fall by a transitional
government, and in preparation for a national conference on the
country's constitutional future."0 ' The conference convened in Octo-
ber and voted to make itself a sovereign body whose decisions would
be binding and not subject to government approval °. 2 The Constitu-
tion was drafted in February, 1997. It provided that the whole power
of the state shall be derived from the people and shall be asserted
both directly and through the bodies established by the Constitution:
the Council of Elders, 0 the Parliament, and the Cabinet.'04 One of
Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 24.
29 Bali, Somaliland: An Introduction, supra note 281, at 15.
25 Adam, supra note 4, at 82.
29 Id. at 83-84.
27 Clan elders also negotiated a peaceful settlement of the civil war within Somaliland and it
is "mainly to the Guurti's credit that peace was maintained throughout the transitional period."
Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 24.
29 Mohamed Bali, Somaliland: From Clan Dictatorship to Self-determination, (January/March
1996) <http://www.anaserve.com/-mbali/intro.html> [hereinafter Self-Determination].
See id. at 6.
Bernard Helander, Somaliland: Example or Exception?, in NEWS FROm NAI (visited Apr. 1,
1999) <http://www.antro.uu.se/bh/somaliland.htn>. No constitution was prepared in 1995,
however. The persistence of deep clan rivalries resulted in an eighteen-month civil war which
broke out in October, 1994. During this time, energy was spent eliminating the undercurrents
of discontent.
301 Bali, Somaliland An Introduction, supra note 281, at 21. In September, the Guurti an-
nounced that elections would be held and legislation was introduced to repeal the emergency
decree of November, 1994 which suspended the Borama Charter when civil war broke out in
October, 1994. In January, the Council of Guurti announced that legislation would be drafted
for the adoption of a new constitution. Id. at 21-22.
M Id. at 27.
303 The Council of Elders will deal with clan conflicts, seek reconciliations, and retain peace.
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the most important indicators of a sustainable state in Somaliland was
the initiative taken by Somaliland's clan elders to broker peace be-
tween the different communities living in the country. The council
of elders has full authority to convene conferences, representing all
of the communities of Somaliland, and to decide on political meas-
ures to resolve outstanding problems.5" A central administration has
been established to supervise and encourage autonomous regional
and district authorities, and parliament passed laws governing these
local institutions." 7 Regions were given time to hold indirect elec-
tions at the district level, prior to forming Regional and District
Councils. Each district has its own police force that is sustained solely
by the payment or issuance of rations, since neither the government
nor the Regional or District Councils have generated sufficient reve-
nues to pay wages.
Thus far, the political process has demonstrated the positive side
of clanship and stands in sharp contrast to the high-profile, extremely
expensive, and much less successful peacemaking effort, of the
United Nations and other foreign organizations in southern Soma-
lia.s In proceedings that continued for three months, the Guurti
confirmed that it would formally transform itself into an upper legis-
lative body in 1997, when the transitional regime was due to expire.
The Guurti drafted a transitional national charter and appointed an
interim Parliament and Supreme Court. This acceptance of plural-
ism and dissent has continued to influence this still developing polity.
There are authoritative checks on the executive in Somaliland. The
SH "Many believe this collaboration between ancient and modem forms of gowmment could
provide a model for other parts of Africa." Flint, supra note 283, at 37.
s Warsame and Brons, supra note 283, at 24.
Thus far it appears that a constitution has yet to be drafted and fully implemented. The
Borama Charter, drafted in 1993, was suspended in 1994 during dte civil war. This suspension
was repealed in 1996, but a conference in October, 1996 announced the dissolution of the na-
tional assembly. The events unfolded as follows:
[T]he national was conference convened on October 10; subsequently, the
conference voted to make itself a sovereign body, whose decisions were to
be binding and not to be subject to government approval. In mid-January.
the conference announced that legislation to be drafted for tie adoption
of a new constitution and the dissolution of the national assembly, seeral
national institutions and regional bodies. A legislative council of the re-
public was to supervise the implementation of the conferences' decisions,
pending the adoption of the constitution and the holding of legislative and
presidential elections. As in the Borama Charter of 1993, the principle of
separation of powers is prescribed and provided for the legislature, excu-
tive, and judicial functions of the government to be divided among three
separate branches. That is, one branch functions to formulate and enact
laws, another to see that the laws are carried out, and a third to determine
whether the laws are in agreement ith the constitution.
Bali, Somaliland. An Introduction, supra note 281, at 21.
See genera/y Gordon, United Nations, supra note 19; Gordon, Humanialrian Intenentin, su-
pra note 19.
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powerful clans are an independent and diffused loci of potential re-
sistance to the state.3 The national Guurti has proven to be a match
for the head of state and the ruling party's central committee, creat-
ing a genuine balance of power. As an organization which encom-
passes all of the nation's clans, the Guurti collectively stands for in-
terests that transcend narrow preferences.310 Those who serve in the
Guurti are both traditional agents and leaders, although their selec-
tion is almost invariably based on a process that western constitution-
alists would not identify as strictly democratic. A more complete re-
surgence of civil society can be seen in the creation of directly
representative civic organizations over the past two years.
In its eight years as a nation, Somaliland has successfully staged
three national elections. The last of these elections, when the presi-
dent and the legislature were elected for five-year terms, was held in
May, 1997. 311 Somaliland has sought to learn from the failed state of
Somalia by avoiding the consolidation of power in one particular
clan, and since Egal's election, no clan has enjoyed a clearly
hegemonic position. Instead, the creation of indigenous political
and economic structures are encouraged in order to promote grass-
roots self-determination. Egal has established a government and has
begun to build an administration with a large clan base that also in-
cludes SNM leaders.12 In addition, subgroups have relatively clear
boundaries, and communities have more or less preeminent secular
and religious leaders.
Although the modernization of Somaliland is the goal, the total
remaking of civil society is not envisioned. The acceptance of most
forms of traditional social organization means clan autonomy will
largely be recognized, as will the authority of local leaders.3 " Conse-
quently, the regime will not have to impose its will by force. "The
role of 'traditional' elders (both secular and religious) has been both
visible and positive."14 However, it may also mean a lesser commit-
ment to confront gender inequality.3 5 The condition and status of
In Somaliland, clans and their leaders are not civil society; they are merely autonomous
reproductions of the state on a smaller scale. Since each clan jealously guards its sovereignty
and separateness, cross-clan interest coalitions are seldom formed, except to confront powerful
alliances of other clans. Bali, Somaliland: An Introduction, supra note 281, at 3-4.
310 See Warsame & Brons, supra note 283, at 24-25 (discussing the benefits of the Guurti).
The SNM leadership has also acquiesced to the Guurti.
311 See Flint, supra note 283, at 37-38.
312 See Noor, supra note 17, atD6.
31 See Adam, supra note 4, at 87 (noting that a decentralized power structure is most com-
patible with the history of Somalia and will likely be the best course for maintaining stability).
314 Id. at 80.
315 For example, there were reports of armed men demanding that women either pay protec-
tion money or hand over property. Displaced women without the protection of nearby male
kinsmen are especially at risk of being raped and abused. Somali women's groups have contin-
ued to respond to such lawlessness by denouncing incidents of violence, through public pro-
tests, and by demanding inclusion at all levels to ensure the government takes appropriate ac-
tion against the perpetrators. Dale Bricker & Leah Leatherbee, Consensus and Dissent in the Horn
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women may be foreshadowed by the recent expansion of Islamic fun-
damentalism in Somaliland, and pockets of Islamic fundamentalism
among fighters in most of the clan-based liberation movements."7
Somalis have made inroads in rebuilding their society on other
fronts. For example, company and investment laws have been
drafted sIS Yet even apart from the effect of such laws, commerce has
resumed.1 9 Entrepreneurs imported electric generators, recondi-
tioned them, and used them to supply streets and homes with elec-
tricity at reasonable rates. External telephone and fax facilities are
available via satellite; an internal telephone system for Har~eisa has
been reconditioned, and overhead lines have been installedf-"' Many
professionals, such as doctors and nurses have remained in the coun-
try, while teachers have begun to revive rudimentary forms of school-
ing in urban areas.321 Although only a few Somalis in the public sec-
tor can be paid wages because of the limited revenue available to the
government,-' there appears to be a spirit of self-help and a determi-
nation to be self-reliant. There remains a need for a broadcasting sys-
tem, which would assist in disseminating information to check ru-
mors and lies, s2' and to assist in explaining new governing
structures. 24 Urgent issues include the demobilization and training
of Africa (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://wvw.sas.upenn.edu/african_.studies/hornet/bricker.
htin>.
S1 InJanuary 1993, a local demagogue in Hargeisa incited a gang of young men and boys to
stone five women to death for prostitution. Other individuals have appointed themselves to
police community morals and they denounce women's increasing involvement in commerce, an
area previously within the exclusive province of men. Unfortunately, many women are imr uid-
ows with no other basis of support. Bricker and Leatherbee, supra note 315.
317 Adam, supra note 4, at 81. The clan element tends to check more radical Islamic ele-
ments; however, while dan affiliation divides, Somali's religion unites. Consequently, some Is-
lamists have argued that fundamentalism can prevent the chaos of the south. Nonetheless.
other Muslims have been alarmed by the growth in fundamentalism. Ld.
si Cabdi, supra note 190, at 84.
319 .
Id. The system is operating commercially, with the prospect of new investments to extend
the system via Djibouti for overseas calls.
1 Adam, supra note 4, at 80.
Thousands of students, girls and boys of all ages, sit on empty milk-powder
cans, while qualified teachers use home-made blackboards for instruction.
There is such demand for English and arithmetic, and computer training
for the older students, that schools operate on a shift system. School fees
are around $7-10 a month for each student; about one-third of the stu-
dents are usually unable to pay, but they are not turned away from the
classroom.
Cabdi, supra note 190, at 85. In Somali hospitals, Somali doctors and nurses care for patients
for little or no compensation. XL
id.
32 Elders have had to travel hundreds of kilometers to deliver a speech which could have
been broadcast. Id.
L Id. This would include explaining how regional and district councils function; the impor-
tance of revenue collection; constitutional proposals; and the building of new institutions, both
public and private. Id.
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of the approximately 50,000 SNM and clan Mujaahidiin, 3 5 and the
need for mine-sweeping. There are still 500,000 refugees living in
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Europe, and North America, and assistance is
needed to reintegrate them into society. Micro-rehabilitation has
been the focus of international and local NGO, with some assistance
from UN agencies. No major reconstruction or macro-development
projects have been initiated by donor countries, however, and the
IMF and World Bank refuse to take any action until the Republic of
Somaliland is internationally recognized. 7 Thus, for the time being,
Somalilanders are in charge of their own destinies.
CONCLUSION
Postcolonial constitutions and the institutions and governing
structures that they created were, almost uniformly, inadequate in
sub-Saharan Africa. The administrative system at the foundation of
most new States was coercive, highly centralized, and led to a bur-
geoning, unaccountable bureacracy. The political institutions lay-
ered over this edifice did not grow out of the cultures and experi-
ences of those they were meant to govern. In retrospect, this strategy
appears to have been doomed to irrelevancy from the start, and in-
deed, that has been the fate of most postcolonial Africa constitutions,
and the institutions and structures they wrought.
This scenario should give pause to those who continue to blindly
assert the continued validity of these institutions. The example of
Somaliland portends a possible different path; a path where constitu-
tions are built upon the culture, knowledge, and experiences of the
people who will breathe life into them and make them living docu-
ments that truly matter in the lives of those whom they will govern.
Without any international assistance or input, the Somali people are
attempting to build institutions that address their needs, and that re-
spond to their cultural values and requisites. While the ultimate suc-
cess of their undertaking remains to be seen, surely it is a better
course than the disappointing outcome of most African postcolonial
efforts. Moreover, Somaliland suggests what might happen in the ab-
sence of our assistance and perhaps tells us something about how we
might shape international assistance. In short, the global community
might try to help people build on what they are, instead of trying to
shape them into what we believe they should be.
32 Id. The author describes a pilot program at a camp at Mandera for 6,000 ex-Mtjaahidiin.
Some underwent training as police recruits, while others were trained as carpenters, masons
and in other vocational skills. The men were also given spiritual counseling and adequate
medical treatment. "This disarmament was not carried out by force or even by threat of force,
but through dialogue and persuasion." Id. The remaining Mujaahidiin will be demobilized in a
similar fashion. Id. at 86.
326 Id. An estimated two million mines need to be removed. Id.
527 Id.
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